

In the Third World War

A Political Lexicon for Today's Struggles

∫connessioni precarie

Original edition:
Nella Terza guerra mondiale. Un lessico politico per le lotte del presente
∫connessioni precarie
DeriveApprodi, Bologna 2025

Oasi capitalistiche e pedagogia della guerra: note su Gaza oltre l'indignazione
Giorgio Grappi
connessioniprecarie.org, 21 July 2025

English translation by Steven Cuzner and ∫connessioni precarie

Cover image: *Nell'urlo delle piazze*, ink drawings and collage by Francesca Della Santa; photos by Stella Chirdo

∫connessioni precarie

In the Third World War

A Political Lexicon for Today's Struggles

2026

List of Contents

p. 5 Preface to the English Edition

IN THE THIRD WORLD WAR. A POLITICAL LEXICON FOR TODAY'S STRUGGLES

p. 13 Introduction

p. 19 Third World War. To get it over with the politics of sacrifice
The other world wars – In the global disorder – Organising against war

p. 31 Transnational. After Internationalism
For a transnational critique of political economy – Imperialism – Multipolarism – Internationalism

p. 41 State. Forms of command and paths of the living labour
The state as articulation in process – Lines of valorisation – Executive and governance structures – Decomposed territories – War as a process of socialisation

p. 51 Militarism. An ideology of social reproduction
Partial mobilisation and fragmentation – Patriarchy, violence, authoritarianism – A political regulator – Against the logic of the enemy

p. 61 Migrants. Movements in the storm of war
Strategic racism – Mobility policies – Rights and deportations

p. 71 Climate conflicts. Fighting in a warlike environment
Critique of transition – The transnational clean factory – Climate class conflict

p. 81 Decolonial. Beyond campism
Decolonial ruptures – Decoloniality of war – Beyond decolonial binarism

p. 93 Resistance. To struggle across the fronts
Resistance within struggles – Resisting campism – Resistance/transformation

p. 103 Strike the war. For a transnational politics of peace
The conundrum of peace – No justice, no peace? – Strike against the war's work – Rejection of war and transnational organisation

CAPITALIST OASES AND THE PEDAGOGY OF WAR
by Giorgio Grappi

p. 115 Notes on Gaza beyond Indignation

The web of value – Outside exceptionalism – The dirty work of capital – Capitalist oases – Beyond the paradigm of indifference – A politics in the world

p. 131 Bibliography

Preface to the English edition

When we published the Italian edition of this book in May 2025, it was already clear that what we called the *Pax Trumpiana* was an integral part of the Third World War scenario. The fragments of peace achieved have been nothing but the continuation of war by other means, while both peace and war have become tools of domestic politics and ways to impose the needs of US capitalism. Since he took office, the "pacifist" Trump bombed Iran, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Yemen, and Nigeria, and now has attacked Venezuela and kidnapped its president, Nicolás Maduro. He did so to force a reversal of the policies of state control over strategic commodities—oil first and foremost—set in motion by Hugo Chávez twenty-five years ago, and thereby to curb Russian, and above all Chinese, influence in Latin America. The "special military operation" ordered by the Trump administration lays bare the essentially void nature of any appeal to international law. It belongs fully to the Third World War—understood as beginning with Russia's invasion of Ukraine—because it is driven by an arrogant and desperate attempt to reassert U.S. supremacy amid a transnational disorder that is increasingly ungovernable.

The celebration of supposedly irresistible American power confirms that militarism is steering the White House: military action is explicitly legitimized as the means to secure safety and profits for the United States and for those who submit to its claim to hegemony over the Western Hemisphere. This is one of the key principles of Trump's new National Security Strategy. For this reason, the military operation in Venezuela goes well beyond the aim of "regime change", an aim that, day by day, appears less relevant and less necessary in light of Caracas's readiness to cooperate. It also goes beyond the repudiation of national sovereignty and peoples' self-determination, principles that international law has in any case ceased to safeguard for some time now.

In this transnational disorder, it is no longer necessary

to invoke the exporting of democracy—which for today's West has become little more than an antiquarian relic—to justify war. Nor is it any longer necessary to wrap brutality in the cloak of progress, civilization, or modernization: the old rhetorical screens have fallen. War is asserted openly as war—an ever-available means of seizing other people's territories and resources, and a tool for ensuring the valorization of capital. The Trumpian state thus behaves like a textbook imperialist state, promising individual capitalists fresh opportunities for valorization and a smoother rhythm of accumulation, but it does so in a phase defined by instability and shocks—features of a world war that cannot, in truth, be governed.

We must therefore ask: does this resurgence of imperialism amount to its full-scale return, or is it rather a posture—an ideological maneuver saturated with militarism—without the material foundations to give it real substance? Placing the latest events in Venezuela within the Third World War means for us to question the old words that were used to read a reality that has by now irrevocably passed. As a matter of fact, if there are continuities with Nineteenth- and early Twentieth-century imperialism, and with the neocolonialism of the late twentieth century—"the last stage of imperialism," in Kwame Nkrumah's famous formulation—there are also stark differences. The major oil firms have proved slow, if not openly reluctant, to fall in behind Trump's imperial designs. And Trump's insistence that he will be the one to decide Venezuela's fate does not resolve the issue of the institutional, financial, and political guarantees that companies demand before making investments.

Trump's imperial projections—and the surplus of political command he must continually invoke the more its ineffectiveness becomes apparent—do not, in short, offer capital a safe bargain, as was the case in classical imperialism and, in different ways, in neocolonialism. And this is not because of the still-uncertain transition at the top of the Caracas government, but because no state—not even the United States—now possesses the capacity to tame the transnational disorder and impose stable political control over it. There is no longer a Wilhelmine empire able to

mobilize German industrial and financial capital for its power politics in Africa and Asia; but neither is there a Gaullist state that, with one hand, abandoned Algeria while, with the other, escorted French energy companies into the heart of the Sahara to exploit its oil fields, according to the classic neocolonial model. Nor is there any longer a George W. Bush state that, through "international policing," could still aspire to restore an order and a peace steeped in terror to the global market. Those state forms have been swallowed by the swirls of transnational disorder, and they are unlikely to resurface.

However much it postures as a collective capitalist, it is therefore reasonable to doubt that the Trumpian state can truly function as one today, given capital's fully transnational character and the infrastructural power that operates within global production chains. Beyond the United States' overt imperial stance, alignment between the state—in this case, the United States—and the largest capitalist firms is far from guaranteed. That is also why the Trump administration must lift its chin and flex its muscles, proclaiming that it can subordinate to its designs a transnational capital that has long made instrumental use of the state when necessary while retaining wide margins of autonomy. In this way, too, the militarist ideology that fuels the world disorder of war is displayed—an ideology that, within national borders, is meant to bind together social blocs that are beginning to fray or to revolt, as they did in Minneapolis, New York, Portland, and other U.S. cities against the unpunished violence of ICE's thuggish squads.

The price Trumpian militarism is extracting from living labor in the United States is enormous. Dismantling what remains of the social content of the old twentieth-century state and replacing it with a state free to act through its military apparatus requires the full availability for work of men and women who have been stripped, among other things, of collective bargaining—even in those workplaces where it continued, battered, to survive. Resignation to dark times is never an answer. Instead, we must look to those subjects who move beneath Trump's imperial pretensions, within and against the contradictions and limits of his militarism as of his fragile peace projects, to make out the

contours of a plausible social opposition—one whose image is currently obscured by a muscular display of force in Latin America and, tomorrow, perhaps in Greenland.

To underline the contradictions of this purported imperialism does not mean waiting for opposition to Trump to come from transnational corporations, which will, as always, find spaces in which to expand their balance sheets. In the context of climate crisis, the capital Trump would like to command reveals its irrationality precisely in its refusal to abandon—or even scale back—fossil fuels. If Trump speaks of Venezuela only in terms of oil, it is nonetheless clear that all his threats toward Latin American countries are part both of a global trajectory of confrontation with China's rise and of a kind of encirclement war against the progressive governments of Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico. Trump and Trumpism are trying to settle accounts with governments that have actually intervened in wealth distribution and in long-standing hierarchies, unleashing processes of mass politicization.

From our standpoint, however, we also have to reckon with the limits of those experiences and with the contradictions and polarizations they generated within their own social base, so as not to capitulate to what today may otherwise appear as total political impotence in the face of the violent and uncontrolled ascent of the right in countries such as Chile, Bolivia, and Argentina. From the standpoint of living labor, it is not possible today to defend the indefensible Maduro or to mourn Chávez's Bolivarian project. For this reason, beyond the geopolitical puzzle of Latin America and without indulging in nostalgia, our concern is to reassert the standpoint of women, workers, and migrants—even now, when that standpoint seems to vanish before the apparently unchallenged supremacy of armed violence, state authoritarianism, militarism, and patriarchy.

We must recognize that labor, feminist, and Indigenous movements in Venezuela do not accommodate themselves to the present state of affairs. We must stand with the miners of the Orinoco Mining Arc, whom Maduro—already with Decree 2248—handed over to hyper-exploitation and sexual violence, to forms of slave- and child-labor fed by U.S., Canadian,

Russian, and Chinese multinationals, and whose conditions will certainly not improve under the new Trumpian course. Beneath the surface of a bankrupt Bolivarianism—one that has financed Venezuela's recent economic growth by compressing workers' wages—there is a social conflict to improve living and working conditions that, in the public as in the private sector, has challenged government repression and today constitutes the only credible opposition to Trump's plans and the tenets of the only politics of peace that erases the very causes of war.

We must therefore take their side, as well as the side of the tens of thousands of Venezuelan migrants on U.S. soil who, already deprived by Trump of guarantees of residence, now wonder what will become of their permits once Venezuela is supposed to return to being a country "freed" from the odious "dictator." The specter of deportation makes clear one of the principal spoils of this war—especially since National Security demands that whatever government sits in Caracas manage migration flows from Venezuela according to the principle of profitable security.

In the search of a lexicon for the struggles of the present, we ask: does the lens of anti-imperialism really help us understand these movements, and what they share with those who, on this side of the ocean, oppose a Europe at war, and with those in the United States who reject Trump's policies? We doubt it, because it tends to reproduce the logic of campist geopolitics, preventing us from fully embracing the transnational character that social struggles, too, must now assume if they are to unfold politically. Transnational disorder nullifies any hope of socialism in a single country—or a single region—and of an internationalism that nourishes false hopes in "resistant" states or conjures alliances among peoples who are not invincibly united but are traversed by fractures and differences that can be rearticulated only on a transnational level. The transnational dimension does not pose merely a quantitative problem of scale, but a qualitative one: it changes the nature of the social relation of capital within, across, and beyond state borders and therefore demands a new organizational structure of class relations—no longer recomposable within any international, national,

regional, bipolar, or multipolar order. As the essay added as an appendix to this English edition shows, also the genocide in Gaza and the project of the Gaza Riviera cannot be understood simply as the repetition of a century-long colonial logic but needs to be considered as the reactivation of that conflict within new transnational dynamics.

Anti-imperialist and campist options thus remain perpetually one step behind a Third World War that, day after day, presses forward, intensifies, and ramifies. We will not build opposition to this war and to Trump's imperial plans by backing supposed dissident governments. They don't become our friends simply because they are outside of the Western axis. We will build an opposition to the Third World War only from the movements and struggles of women, LGBTQ+ people, migrants, workers, students, and working people that already exist or are taking shape. We need a transnational politics of peace to expand these movements and struggles and to rearticulate them within a broader political space in which all those who, everywhere, are paying the military and social costs of the world war now under way can communicate and recognize one another. A politics capable of opposing a war that is not localized in a single point but claims to saturate our entire lives—leaving them suspended by the thread of bombardment on battlefields, crushing them elsewhere in the gears of unending labor, impoverishing them everywhere until not even the shadow of refusal and insubordination remains.

Yet this nightmare of a Trumpian night is not already reality, nor it is our destiny. Not only do we see flashes of opposition to the current administration spreading across the United States; in Palestine as in Ukraine, in Iran as in Venezuela, men and women have never ceased to fight against the "double siege" of those who bring war and extermination from outside and those who, from within, seek to neutralize every form of struggle that is not subordinated to the logic of blood and oppression that war itself imposes. This is the path traced by those who, in recent years, have survived and resisted missiles, drones, and snipers. It seems to us a path worth taking also for those who, on this side of the world, within a Europe at war, are struggling—in a more

or less organized way—against militarism and its logic.

At the end of the book, we wrote that, against the inevitability of war, we need to build an organization that should turn our politics of peace into a practical guide for preparing the conditions of a transnational social strike against the war and its world. In autumn 2025 we saw dozens of Italian cities being stormed by workers, students, migrants, women, men and LGBTQ+ on strike against the genocide in Palestine and the logic of war, while hundreds of thousands of people were demonstrating around the world. We have seen students in Germany going on strike in 100 cities against the introduction of compulsory military service. We are seeing now millions of people in Iran risking their lives and refusing to entrust their liberation from the Islamic republic to the bombs threatened by Trump. Now we can sense what a strike against war can actually mean more clearly than we did one year ago. This makes the call for a transnational organization that is up to the task of making this possibility a long-lasting force even more urgent.

January 2026

Introduction

This book emerges from three years of struggle against the war. Immediately after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, we—together with hundreds of activists from the Permanent Assembly Against the War, which was formed within the Transnational Social Strike Platform—worked to find ways to break the fronts that were rapidly solidifying. Activists from Russia and Ukraine began to speak with others from virtually every part of the world, and at times we managed to build forms of joint initiative. After 7 October 2023 and the invasion of Gaza, the assemblies grew to include Palestinians and Israelis as well. Again, we tried not to get sucked into the logic that builds existential enemies outside of any consideration of the social, sexual and historical relationships within which war conflicts mature. This political choice has never meant practising an easy equidistance; instead, it has required taking a clear stand against war and its world.

However, the experience of these many assemblies—and of the many agreements they produced—also revealed the limits of the discourses and initiatives. Divergent positions often led to paralysis and even aphasia, or to a conscious decision to bracket the war in order to find convergence on almost anything else. Without cataloguing everything we have seen and heard over these three years, we want at least to note this: without reflecting on how we speak about war, and how we try to read it alongside all the other conflicts in everyday life, we cannot come to terms with it.

This book was written as a response to this need. It does not claim to describe the current war in all its facets and internal dynamics, nor to situate it fully within the history of wars. Nor do we aim to retrace the myriad of ways in which peace and war have become tools of domestic political legitimisation since Donald Trump's election. Instead, we argue that it is essential to *recognise war* as an urgency that cannot be ignored by anyone unwilling to accept the present order of things. For this reason, we discuss several key terms

through which the discourse of war extends beyond the battlefield. These terms redefine large domains of political intervention—migration, climate conflicts, the state—as well as the concepts that legitimate war (militarism) and those that make its contestation so difficult (decoloniality and resistance).[1] Our aim is to help build a lexicon for the struggles of the present: one that equips us with tools to oppose war and overcome the deadlocks that have hindered us in recent years. Faced with the omnipresence and apparent omnipotence of weapons, we have taken a step back and returned to the weak weapon of criticism, armed with the conviction that it can move us a few steps forward in our opposition to war.

Beyond rejecting the rule of weapons, we hold that a radical critique of war is necessary because war cannot serve as a model for class struggle. War claims to establish compact and homogenous fronts by simplifying and neutralising social relations, making it impossible to grasp or develop their complexity. Its logic is the ideological and material elimination of everything—and especially everyone—that exceeds the war fronts. It is the armed denial of the multiplicity of differences that make up contemporary living labour and gives no practical guidance on how these differences might be organised.

The political hypothesis underlying this work begins from this critique of war and the recognition that the Russian invasion of Ukraine marked the start of the Third World War. By this, we do not intend to conjure up the image of an unstoppable escalation and inevitable widening of the conflict. We are not interested here in pursuing the geopolitical dimension of the war or drawing up future scenarios of an international order. We are not interested in war as a system of order in which different regimes can be identified, each with its own capacities of governance. Instead, we approach war from the standpoint of living labour in all its heterogeneity, convinced that locating our own position within and across war's fronts is the first step toward overturning its logic.

[1] Intertextual references to key words in each chapter are indicated in small capital letters.

As in the first two world wars, the decisive issue in this Third World War is not the hegemony of one or several states, but the governance of the living labour in the world market. The Third World War hypothesis allows us to move beyond the particularities of individual conflicts—conflicts in which some wars are deemed paradigmatic and others secondary, some enemies the only true ones. Speaking of a Third World War creates *a field of visibility in which a common logic can be recognised across acts of war*, whether in Ukraine, Taiwan, Gaza or Rojava. Above all, it opens the possibility for different forms of anti-war struggle to communicate with one another. In this way, we aim to inscribe onto the map of geopolitics a different history: that of other conflicts and divisions.

This political hypothesis can be fully understood only within a transnational dimension—one that today marks the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of politically governing the world market and what has been called globalisation in recent decades. Within this transnational framework, the governance of living labour becomes increasingly complex, and war and militarism return as plausible instruments of command. The tensions in the Middle East (Iran, Israel, Turkey, Syria), as well as those in the United States and Russia, clearly reveal a shared attempt to respond to the fractures running through regimes of social governance across vast regions of the planet.

While it remains possible that war could assume a genuinely global dimension, our question is not how to prevent war from spreading, but how this war can end. We ask whether living labour, in all its multiplicity, can exert a political claim on the ending of war. Can the peace we seek be something other than a condition that must simply be endured? Because violence, devastation and massacres overwhelmingly fall upon the poor, women, migrants and wage-earners in every case, it is absolutely necessary to open space for action and reflection against war. What is at stake is the possibility of producing organisational processes commensurate with the transnational importance of living labour.

It would seem reasonable, at this point, to note that the

hypothesis of an emerging Third World War is not contradicted by the fact that it is not fought with the same intensity everywhere—from Donald Trump's actions to Vladimir Putin's intentions to the European Union's 'rearmed peace'. Meanwhile, Benjamin Netanyahu is allowed to ignore that the hour of peace has come, enabling Israel to continue slaughtering Palestinians with impunity. The *Pax Trumpiana*—for now more proclaimed than concretely achieved—likewise includes the bombing of Yemen and the continual threat toward Iran and its oppressive regime, from which many Iranians also seek liberation.

Many will insist that a bad peace is almost always preferable to any war. And it is undeniably true that those living under bombardment, facing hunger, cold and imminent death, welcome any peace or even a fragile truce. In the face of war, of any war, the first demand is always that the weapons fall silent.

Yet despite the peace plans and ceasefires that have been proposed, we still consider the Third World War hypothesis valid. The fragments of peace currently granted to us appear to be merely the continuation of war by other means. The *Pax Trumpiana* is justified as necessary for processes of capital valorisation—above all US accumulation—and is presented as a "Versailles of capital": a series of peace agreements proposed, imposed or coerced in the name of the needs of US capitalism. After World War I, Lord Keynes argued that the Versailles peace contradicted economic reason and would therefore lead inevitably to another war. We, by contrast, argue that *Pax Trumpiana*'s attempt to crush the social and political conflicts proliferating worldwide prevents the causes of war from being eliminated.

Peace cannot consist in the territorial concessions that the Ukrainian government may be forced to accept in exchange for access to rare minerals. Peace cannot rest on the pacification of the Middle East through legitimising Israel's war of extermination against the Palestinians. Peace cannot mean that economic supremacy is pursued through threatened or imposed trade tariffs. And peace cannot be built upon the persecution of migrants—by legal or illegal

means—or upon the legal suppression of all forms of sexual freedom.

Trump's supposed pacifism is not the opposite of Biden's warmongering; it is its continuation. In both cases, war is severed from the social contradictions of the US and the world, and social relations are overwritten according to its logic. Their synthesis is easily visible in the European Commission's policies: it first rearmed Ukraine and now resolutely aims to rearm the EU, fully aware that, in both cases, war erases any possibility for social reconstruction. Because the political and social roots of war are not being addressed, we do not believe that a genuine prospect of peace is emerging.

Commenting on Zelensky's theatrical ouster from the White House, Viktor Orbán declared: Strong men make peace, while weak men make war. In this formulation, peace becomes the legitimating privilege of the "strong man," the figure to be trusted—or rather, submitted to. It becomes the misogynistic and patriarchal fantasy of a man who imposes a hierarchy of interest through his superior will, a peace that coincides with subservience to power. This is the opposite of what we have understood in recent years as the transnational politics of peace.

This is not a pacifist book. Our concern is not to end the war by imagining peace treaties or proposing truces. Those who seek peace at any cost fail to see that in doing so, they simply reproduce the old conception of peace as the mere absence of war. They overlook the fact that peace is the continuation of war by other means, that it is a peace subservient to the despotic power of a capital in its political incarnations. For such perspectives, the absence of bombs is enough: social conflicts, tensions, and daily oppressions are assumed to resolve themselves. We disagree. While we welcome every truce and pause in wartime violence with relief and joy, in this book, we attempt to look at war not only through the lens of danger, death, and destruction—though these must be avoided at all costs—but also from the standpoint of the organisational processes we can create within and against war (TSS Platform 2023). *Our problem is not simply to condemn war but to oppose its harsh reality with words and practices that escape its logic.*

1 Third World War

To get it over with the politics of sacrifice

We often speak of peace, but we have been living in a war for three years. Donald Trump recently promised to end it, but we cannot regard him as a pacifist. Nor can we trust the pacifism of the European Union when it insists that future peace can only be guaranteed by European weapons. Of course, it is welcomed that thousands of women and men in Ukraine and elsewhere might no longer be forced to risk their lives on the battlefield or face death under bombs, hunger, or deprivation. Yet Palestine shows that war can continue both within and beyond a truce. A truce is never PEACE—especially when the same president who demands one in Ukraine invokes a 200-year-old war measure in the United States to deport many thousands of migrants. The *Pax Trumpiana* will not be our peace.

For some time, we have been confronted with a deadly interweaving of wars, truces, conflicts and oppressions that reinforce and motivate each other. The constitutive link between political order and civil war seems to be reactivated again and again (Colombo 2021; Lazzarato 2024). This state of affairs produces opposing reactions: war may be viewed as an inevitable, if not a necessary, outcome of contemporary society, or it may be treated as the singular extreme event that must be avoided at all costs for social life to continue. In the first case, war becomes indifferent; in the second, it is bracketed, even ignored, even though it remains part of a social relationship.

We aim to escape this alternative. We speak of a Third World War not to construct a model into which all present conflicts must fit, nor to announce an apocalyptic scenario designed to provoke fear. Our interest is not in panic. For us, the Third World War has an eminently political meaning. What matters is how the present war can and must end. We

ask: how can this war end, if we refuse the endless cycle of battle, ceasefire and rearmament? How can it be won in any meaningful sense? How can we imagine its end without leaving the question wholly to the geopolitical monopoly that casts states or parastatal regimes as the only actors?

We invoke the Third World War because, like the previous two, it does not consist solely, or even primarily, of clashes between states seeking global hegemony. In the earlier world wars, what was at stake was not only the contest between states for dominance but also the struggle to command living labour. Wars became world wars when they globally became both a constitutive and an antagonistic factor for the reproduction of capitalist society. World wars are not wars between states in search of a more or less imperial projection, but they are wars that invest and redefine capitalist society on a global scale.

The decline of US hegemony has established the conditions for the possibility of multipolarity, a situation that appears to produce multiple war regimes rooted in the conflicts of competing factions of capital and the endless territorial or religious disputes that characterise global society. At the same time, capital's need to pursue the multiplicity of living labour figures—exploiting them in different places and at different times, assigning them specific modes of recognition that determine whether they can be seen or heard (Butler 2009)—is unmistakable. The Third World War does not impose any immediate or violent unification of the conditions of exploitation and oppression. In its encounters with the diverse figures of social multiplicity, it reveals its own specific function: attempts to pacify social, ideological and productive forces—to reconcile conflicting parties through partial and occasional reparations—so that capital can operate on a global scale.

We must therefore avoid the trap of the concrete: stopping at the multiplicity of material positions and the consequent proliferation of sociological categories that describe, more or less faithfully, the forms of oppression and exploitation. This approach can never produce the comprehensive field of visibility we require, because the multiplicity of political and social figures is the form of the

problem, not its solution. A comprehensive field of visibility allows us to grasp not only differences but also the connections between phenomena that would otherwise appear as isolated singularities incapable of speaking to one another.

Multipolarity in itself does not guarantee the integrity of social movements. Although it may provide an accurate map of existing conditions with their profound differences that resist homogenisation, it risks giving each "pole" a uniform aura in which struggles and processes of capital valorisation appear to follow one another without interruption. Our problem is to identify the possibility of a radical break from this reality and the logic of war that structures it: to insist on the fundamental difference between war and the politics of struggles, and to reorient our gaze toward social movements that—despite their differences—can establish TRANSNATIONAL communication capable of crossing fronts and questioning their very existence.

Only in this way can we construct a field of visibility in which the end of the Third World War is not a temporary peace, nor a victory that conceals a defeat, but the affirmation of the power of living labour in the reproduction of society. This is not a utopian project. The world wars of the past may already offer practical clues.

The other world wars

The First World War began with the catastrophe of the socialist movements and parties, which squandered the strength accumulated by the European workers' movement in previous decades by supporting their respective governments' entry into the war. In our view, it ended with the October Revolution—that is, with the refusal to continue participating in an inter-imperialist war and the transformation of that war into something profoundly different. The Second World War began with the mass ascendancy of fascism and Nazism and ended with their defeat; with the victory of the Chinese Revolution; with the final acceleration of decolonisation; and with the thirty-year expansion of welfare systems in the West. Millions of proletarians fought against Nazi-fascism across the world

and finally saw their participation in the war, and their sacrifice, recompensed in their daily lives. Obviously, no analogy or continuity with the past can reassure us today. Yet the task is to overturn the perspective according to which wars end only through the decisions of states, by their victories or their defeats. We need to register that a space of decision-making has opened—one in which something must be done—and to ask how living labour can win something, how to activate processes that subvert the war, now that transnational disorder has exploded the very possibility of a labour movement on a national or even internationalist basis.

This is why the hypothesis of a Third World War is a political one: because it raises the problem of how such a war might end, without claiming to describe everything that is occurring. It registers the end of any attempt to impose a political command over economic globalisation. By disintegrating the power once accumulated by the industrial proletariat, the neoliberal restructuring of the 1980s and 1990s laid the foundations for a multiplicity of insurgencies that posed the problem of governing living labour on a global scale in entirely new ways—even when these insurgencies manifested themselves locally, in the apparent return to identity-based closures of nation-states or in the anachronistic reassertion of the West as the sole bearer of universal values.

Today, war is not global simply because many states are involved, nor because its theatre is planetary. Extensive wars with devastating numbers of casualties have been raging for years in various regions. But Russia's invasion of Ukraine marked a decisive shift: the global political governance of capitalist dynamics and of the movements of living labour suddenly proved unstable—and practically impossible. The question is not whether we are witnessing the end of globalisation understood as the interconnection of economic processes that everywhere bear the mark of their capitalist nature. In Ukraine—and just as dramatically in Palestine—the war has exposed the sheer insubstantiality of any global political governance of the contradictions generated by capitalist processes, and of the antagonisms that characterise them. While one could certainly identify many historical

processes that have led to this situation—regional disputes, religious conflicts, economic competition, imperial revanchism, hegemonic struggles—our interest lies in how these contradictions not only affect women, LGBTQ+ people, precarious workers and migrants differently, but also how the movements of these subjects are themselves essential factors of instability within all these processes. Only from the standpoint of these social movements can one grasp the war, its global character, and pose the question of how it might end under their sign and not through their further subordination. For all these movements, the problem is not the contingent causes of wars, but how to end this war.

In the global disorder

The political hypothesis of a Third World War thus registers the explosion of the economic, political and social forms of mediation at a planetary scale. Diplomatic solutions and international institutions have progressively lost importance, while supranational institutions are criticised, if not openly delegitimised. Appeals to human rights appear increasingly outdated, especially where those rights are not even protected within the very states that have pledged to uphold them in their constitutions. The narrowing of access to citizenship and the hollowing-out of the right to asylum—even within so-called democratic countries—makes this trend clear. The uselessness of UN resolutions and the consequence-less condemnations issued by international courts against perpetrators of genocide or "special operations" show that there is no supranational power, no arbiter capable of imposing order or ending the carnage. That Trump's United States claims to be the sole power able to decide on peace and war is the starkest sign of the crisis of any international order, as well as of its multipolar translation.

While it marks the definitive crisis of the so-called international society, the Third World War coincides with the most violent manifestation of what we have long called the transnational. It is characterised by the impossibility of imposing a stable and continuous global order: a moving scenario rather than a static and consolidated reality. The

poles emerging from the crisis of bipolarity do not lay the foundations for the much-desired new world order; they are the clearest symptom of its practical impossibility. We face a sharp discontinuity that blocks any territorialised approach to war. Gone are the targeted operations and humanitarian wars of the 1990s: today, every place is touched by a war that reopens pre-existing conflicts, making them explode in even more violent and atrocious forms, as in Palestine. If the Iraq wars marked the crisis of the twentieth-century international order, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has revealed the crisis of the global order that took shape in the first two decades of the twenty-first.

It has shown that capitalist globalisation can no longer present itself as a global order. The Third World War is a planetary disorder in which alliances and alignments frequently overlap. One example suffices: Lula's progressive and democratic government in Brazil refuses to take a stand against Putin's autocratic Russia because it considers the struggle against the dominance of the dollar a more relevant question of sovereign currency. Now the *Pax Trumpiana* promises peace in Ukraine while vowing to wipe out Palestine and defend the sovereignty of the dollar through force and tariffs. If in the Second World War it was possible to construct a democratic and social front against fascist dictatorships, today this is no longer the case, despite all attempts to recycle that vocabulary. The democratic political form does not present itself as a credible, comprehensive alternative to more or less autocratic forms. Those same "democracies" are militarily and ideologically supporting the genocide in Gaza, showing themselves open to multiple exceptions to the values that supposedly legitimise democracy itself. Even in Ukraine, democratic decision-making follows the neoliberal canon, projecting a political system resistant to any social recognition of the political role of living labour. The democratic form of politics struggles—when it has not simply renounced—to serve the function of social mediation that characterised it until the 1970s.

On the terrain prepared by the social-democratic management of neoliberal policies, the global right is implementing authoritarian measures that restrict dissent

and material contestation of those policies designed to ensure the uninterrupted reproduction of capital. From ideological battles over reproduction, to attacks on sexual freedom, to restrictions on forms of trade-union conflict—everything can become part of a democratic politics that, while remaining faithful to its form, grows ever more indifferent to any social content. All these processes make it increasingly difficult to identify a "democratic" side worth supporting in the Third World War. Precisely because authoritarian elements are increasingly permeating the democratic camp, it becomes impossible to present the war as a clash between democracies and autocracies. The grafting of authoritarian elements through formally democratic procedures clearly signals the difficulty of governing living labour and its occasional though constant convergences (Gambino 2003). Because war is the result of a crisis of democratic mediation, it also requires the introduction of ordering schemas such as MILITARISM—schemas that impose themselves even outside the theatres of war. Militarism is not simply a backward-looking ideology; it dictates the present conditions of class struggle (Sánchez Cedillo 2022). It must be understood as part of the authoritarian intensification that becomes necessary within the Third World War. War and militarism re-legitimise the STATE, which re-enters the scene with decisively transformed capacities: no longer guaranteeing social reproduction through welfare systems, but—through the reimposition of social discipline—promising to maintain order domestically and defend borders against both foreign labour power and war itself. Militarism not only prepares people for war; it habituates them to the idea that war is somehow necessary. This is not a militarisation of production or a total mobilisation of society, but a growing need to regulate social behaviour and, above all, the willingness to supply labour even where wages and environmental conditions are wholly inadequate. The shrinking of the space of struggle caused by hardened fronts, the demands to "take sides," and the tolerated excesses of authoritarianism, patriarchy and racism—the corollaries of militarism—serve to reconstitute social discipline and make it impossible to confine war to the territories directly affected

by conflict. War becomes a universal fear and expectation.

Yet the Third World War is marked by the difficulty of deploying living labour in a compact and continuous way within its own front. Total mobilisation is neither possible nor imaginable, because the Third World War is both the cause and the effect of difficulties in controlling labour power so as to articulate accumulation processes on a global scale. This does not mean that accumulation has stopped, but that it must be continually and extensively relocated to ever-new spaces. The struggle for resources is therefore also a struggle for labour power—the most valuable resource, because it alone can valorise all others. This is why the processes of capital valorisation can only be global, even as globalisation has become impossible to produce and govern. These tensions are offloaded onto individual states, which are at once necessary and inadequate—necessary to demarcate spaces of accumulation and secure access to human and material resources, yet insufficient to do so stably. States no longer find their definition within an international society that not only organised their hierarchy but mediated their relations.

Today, states operate within a transnational environment marked by disorder and by struggles for advantage. The Third World War is the military form taken by this ongoing clash, and—like the transnational space—it risks acquiring a "savage" character, resistant to regulation, with capitalist actors who are fully transnational (military and green industries; extractivism for green production or fossil resources; large algorithmic corporations) while still claiming to use state and international rules to their own benefit. Significant segments of living labour—such as MIGRANTS—move at a transnational level as well and are therefore the social movement that both left- and right-wing governments promise to govern and regulate, since they embody a discord that obstructs any regulated compulsion to labour (Alberti–Sacchetto 2024). The feminist movement that opposes oppression is anything but national; its transnational character exposes the historical bases of oppression in the West as much as elsewhere. Transnational, too, are those movements of wage-earners who reject the conditions of

their exploitation, pushing capital itself to assume increasingly transnational dimensions. These pressures underlie the difficulties of political organisation that all these movements now encounter. The Third World War must therefore be read within these material conditions and within the difficulty of governing movements that themselves present as transnational. There is no possibility of an international government of war, while attempts to establish such governance locally or through partial agreements merely lay the groundwork for its continuation. The intrinsically mobile character of living labour—not only of the conflicting components of capital and institutions—means that war cannot become a regime.

Organising against war

How can we fight in—and against—the Third World War? The most immediate answer is to unconditionally support those transnational insubordinations of living labour that resist state and international attempts to govern them. This means politically supporting all behaviours that expose war as a miserable instrument for governing the lives of billions. The response to war should be the political affirmation of transnational living labour: legitimising its movements, its refusal of old and new oppressions, and its unwillingness to be exploited. Yet today the response is often RESISTANCE—that is, taking a position within the war and its fronts. But resistance does not open onto a project of collective liberation; it reinforces opposing fronts, strengthening blocs rather than dissolving them. In Ukraine, resistance has been folded into the state, deepening the division of camps and closing off possibilities for alliances with those—on every side—who flee, desert, struggle to survive, or escape exploitation through strike action, all in rebellion against the logic of war.

The Third World War appears destined to recapitulate the horrors of the previous ones. The resurgence of nationalism and militarism, Russia's imperial pretensions, the genocide in Palestine, and the return of the nuclear nightmare are evident to all. Our question, however, is how to end not this or that conflict, but the Third World War as

such—recognising that interstate peace will not necessarily alter existing power relations or the ungovernability of living labour that the transnational makes visible.

If we begin from the observation that states wage war, then opposing war must involve rejecting both the manner and the reasons for which they wage it. Opposition to war is not achieved by choosing a side within a front, overvaluing some actors while strategically silencing others. A world war is not a civil war, though it may create opportunities to rethink the politics of fronts and camps—precisely the opposite of simply registering the omnipresence of conflict (Münkler 2003). It is highly unlikely—and ultimately not even desirable—that this transnational war ends with a victor or with the re-establishment of a stable international order that installs a handful of states as guardians of world peace. This war is one more episode in the centuries-long crisis of sovereignty. Taking this crisis seriously means recognising that there is no straightforward, state-based exit for the labour movements that persist within it. This recognition forces us to experiment with political forms capable of consolidating the strength of social movements over time.

In the communist tradition, taking sides in—and against—war has never meant accepting its inevitability, nor has war simply been a trigger for insurrection. War was not understood merely as the continuation of normal politics by other means, but as an opportunity to transform politics itself (Lenin 1915; Lenin 1917). Real possibilities for such transformation require political connections that can establish a field of visibility and communication across differences, enabling figures of living labour to escape the classifications imposed on them by war.

Standing with those who suffer war's effects is right, but not sufficient. We must also put an end to war as the paradigm for our struggles. This means resisting organisational forms that mimic opposing armies—with their hierarchies, commands, myths of decisive battles, captured palaces never truly held, and climactic victories that are never final. The history of revolutions shows how complex and problematic the relationship between revolution and war has been (Balibar 2009). Critiquing this relationship requires

reconsidering the historical link between war and class struggle, asking whether war must serve as preparation for future revolution (Lazzarato 2022). Instead, we can begin from the premise that the political rationality of class struggle is foreign not only to war and its material manifestations (Negri 1980), but also to the modern political tradition that bound war and politics together. Class struggle is not simply inscribed in a friend–enemy dialectic, nor is it resolved by identifying opposing fronts whose internal dynamics are then exempt from criticism.

If the opposite of war is not peace as mere absence of conflict—nor pacifism at any cost, nor the governance of political unification through or despite conflict—then class struggle is indeed the opposite of war. It raises questions of peace, conflict, and violence on grounds that modern politics has sought to neutralise (Tronti 2024). The peace we seek embraces the mobile and differentiated character of contemporary living labour and organises forms adequate to its political capacities, rather than confining them within structures shaped only by their own history. At the same time, no local experience—however significant—can be simply "exported" to the transnational level. The transnational demands that we work at the scale of global reality, recognising that the organisational process must confront and critique the differences that have thus far prevented the construction of a concrete opposition to war.

Building a transnational organisation is not merely about surviving within this war but about ending it—creating conditions for emerging without defeat. Peace must therefore signify not only the end of interstate war but also the political presence of all those who now bear the costs of global capital's valorisation (STRIKE THE WAR). Rejection of war already appears in the struggles that unfold within the Third World War, in their opposition to current modes of social reproduction. Ending the war requires producing a space for living labour that crosses fronts and borders—an organisational leap adequate to the transnational condition. Any hypothesis that relies on an order that no longer exists—the society of nations and its national or internationalist movements—fails to reject the war that sustains capitalist

reproduction. Transnational organisation cannot be reduced to alliances between existing structures, often nationally rooted and oriented toward local priorities. It must instead meet the demands of living labour, which experiences war as the key obstacle to its movement. Such an organisation therefore calls for the end of wars between states and regimes, while simultaneously opposing the everyday violences—patriarchal, racist, exploitative—that are socially legitimised as sacrifices in the name of the nation.

2 Transnational

After internationalism

Opposing the THIRD WORLD WAR can only be understood as a form of class struggle. This is to say that, just as war cannot be interpreted solely through the lenses of international relations or geopolitics, resistance to war must begin from its effects on living labour: on workers and precarious workers, on women and MIGRANTS, and on their capacities for movement, communication, and organisation. Recognising this requires grasping the gap that structures the contemporary world, a gap that forces us to rethink and reinvent our political vocabulary. If the Third World War makes visible a profound instability—one that undermines any attempt to politically govern capitalist dynamics and the movements of living labour—we must confront the limits of the political categories that defined previous historical phases, including anti-imperialism and internationalism. A necessary starting point is to understand the transnational as the name of a disorder that no longer fits into any international, national, regional, bipolar, or multipolar order.

The transnational names both the reality of the world market and the movements of living labour that confront that reality by asserting demands for liberation from exploitation and oppression. In this sense, it marks the breakdown of the political and institutional mediations between capital and labour that stabilised the 20th century. Signs of this rupture can be seen in the countless conflicts traversing global chains of production and social reproduction. Yet to build an organisation capable of consolidating the force expressed by living labour, we must understand how the transnational constitutes the concrete terrain of class struggle today.

We therefore use the term transnationalism while distancing ourselves from its common analytical use—especially in migration studies—which has highlighted cross-border economic and social processes. Although this

perspective criticises the national, it does not sufficiently register the internal transformations of what historically constitutes the national, nor does it account for the ways local and territorial formations are transnationally codified. It thus tends to reduce the transnational to a scale of the national (Sassen 2003).

This limited interpretation of the transnational has also shaped many analyses of globalisation. As a result, "global" and "transnational" have often been used to designate an indeterminate scalarity, detached from the concrete realities of territory, exploitation, and state violence. When recent discussions invoke "de-globalisation" to describe contemporary shifts, we must therefore ask which globalisation they refer to. Starting from a simplified notion of globalisation, the rhetoric of de-globalisation wrongly directs our attention toward a supposed return of sovereign national space and reinforces the idea that "the global" and "the national" operate on distinct planes. The transnational we invoke does not describe a spatial scale or geographic movement; it names the qualitatively different political conditions of the present. These conditions have been illuminated by movements and analyses that describe the fragmentation of the world into uneven zones, criss-crossed by conflicts tied to transformations of STATES and territories.

Thus, the transnational is not an economic or sociological category, nor a cartography of political geography, nor a description of a capital that valorises itself beyond national borders. Because it is shaped by both capital and the movements of living labour, the transnational is a political category that signals an unprecedented possibility of collective liberation. At the same time, it reveals the inadequacy of national—and international—frameworks for governing capital and organising labour. It expresses the contemporary balance of forces between capital and labour, which today is overwhelmingly tilted toward capital, with no space for political mediation. The transnational is therefore the historical expression of a conflict that manifests as a latent but persistent class struggle seeking organisation. It is a disorder that cannot be stabilised within the historical forms—national or international—through which the 20th

century structured economies, states, parties, trade unions, and movements.

How, then, can we articulate a political opposition to the Third World War as class struggle? First, the transnational points to the necessity of abandoning political frameworks that position struggles along state or anti-imperial alliances, or culturalist binaries that divide the world into "the West" and "the rest"—categories that have long ceased to have any (DECOLONIAL) coherence. We must move past perspectives destined either to be absorbed by the logic of war or to collapse into predictions of a permanent civil war. Instead, we should look at how the movements of living labour enact the transnational by opening escapes from the blocs that obstruct the force of collective action.

However, the transnational does not itself provide a linear path of communication between the diverse figures of living labour. For this reason, the historical names for such communication—internationalism, Third-Worldism, alter-globalism, anti-globalism—are today insufficient, and in some cases, risk becoming obstacles.

The transnational places the problem of class and organisation on a different terrain. If living labour is "in search of organisation," it is because class can no longer be defined through a unified workers' identity rooted in production, nor dissolved into the multiple identities of race, gender, and culture that emerge from reproduction. Rather, class points to the possibility of a subject constituted in action across production and reproduction—one that mobilises the differences and contradictions that shape the living labour of workers, precarious workers, women, and migrants in the world market (Ricciardi 2023). A transnational critique of political economy is therefore necessary to think about the problem of class and organisation today.

For a Transnational Critique of Political Economy

Over the past decade, numerous studies have shed light on the material dynamics shaping global reality: financial markets, logistical and productive networks, infrastructures, extraction, cloud computing, digitisation. Research on global

value chains, finance, logistics, and supply chains has demonstrated the extent to which capitalist valorisation exceeds any political attempt to direct it. While these processes have shattered the illusion of an international society or world order, they continue to operate despite political efforts at renationalisation or regionalisation—efforts now framed as reshoring, friendshoring, or nearshoring.

This does not imply that the transnational is a smooth space through which capital moves freely. The breakdown of 20th-century mediations between capital and labour—mediations organised around the state—means that their relation is now constantly filtered through governance structures that shape both the transnational configuration of capital (in its financial, industrial, and logistical composition) and the movements and behaviours of living labour. Yet no state, and no alliance of states, can today impose a stable politics of the global, even if states differ in their capacities to intervene (Kupchan 2012). To speak of a breakdown in mediation is not to reintroduce the idea of an autonomous capital or an undefined field of valorisation; rather, it is to give concrete content to the disorder that characterises contemporary global reality (World Economic Forum 2025).

This also means that no territory—including the national—offers a grounded basis for democratic or movement politics capable of breaking the social relation of capital. Territorial and national struggles remain possible and important, as does the need to sustain international communication. But we must recognise their limits and the political effects they cannot produce. The transnational therefore poses the problem of class and organisation without shortcuts along familiar paths.

In recent years, however, real movements have pointed toward the possibility of a transnational class constitution. Migrant labour movements are the most exemplary: they have dismantled any stable division—imperial, colonial, centre/periphery—within the world market. Migrant men and women have challenged supranational labour-governance projects such as the EU and trade agreements in North America and Southeast Asia, and they have confronted

trade unions as national forms of labour organisation. The feminist movement has likewise enacted the transnational by organising against the patriarchal relations that underpin production and reproduction (Rudan 2018). Both movements have, at moments, reappropriated the strike, generating an uneven but unmistakable transnational social movement—defined not only by its non-national and non-identitarian composition but by its refusal of institutionalised mediations. Women and migrants thus signal crucial points of connection with the broader movement of living labour, whose refusal of exploitation intensifies transnational competition among capitals and pushes capital itself into increasingly transnational forms.

From the perspective of the transnational, the historical forms of governing living labour now appear impossible, while the historical forms of organising it have become obstacles to its movement. Though the transnational is more legible from the side of capital, it is harder to grasp it from the side of living labour: migration, mobility, rejection of wage regimes enforced through differentials or union arbitration, rejection of racism and patriarchal oppression, refusal of certain forms of social reproduction. These behaviours do not follow organisational logics based on political spatiality or cultural identity, nor do they scale neatly across them. What is lacking is an adequate elaboration of the transnational political essence of living labour—one capable of opposing the Third World War.

This call for a transnational critique of political economy brings us back to our political vocabulary: imperialism, colonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism. These are anachronistic categories—not because they belong solely to the past, but because they continue to operate in the present in ways that bind the transnational and obstruct its possibilities of movement, communication, and organisation. Critiquing this vocabulary is not a matter of terminology but of opening a political debate on the real possibilities for opposing war by breaking fronts and blocs, freeing ourselves from inherited schemas that have become ineffective. Left unchallenged, these schemas risk reactivating imaginary frameworks that block efforts to intervene in the

unprecedented conditions of exploitation and oppression being intensified by the Third World War. What is needed is a collective reconsideration of the movement's discourse—one adequate to the new transnational framework.

Imperialism

The renewed use of "imperialism" and "anti-imperialism" in movement discourse—often paired with the language of "RESISTANCE"—has strongly shaped reactions to the ongoing war. This was visible in the debates around the Russian invasion of Ukraine, where some activists supported Ukrainian MILITARISM in the name of anti-imperialism. By framing Russia's invasion as a continuation of historical expansionism, these positions not only erased supranational struggles and experiments that marked parts of the Soviet experience; they also helped foster an illusion of a unified popular resistance in Ukraine. This illusion, in turn, fed new nationalist political, economic, and cultural forms that shrink spaces of movement and struggle across the post-Soviet region (Permanent Assembly Against the War 2023).

Conversely, anti-American anti-imperialism led others to support Russia's invasion from an anti-NATO perspective—thereby also supporting the war. Reviving distinctions from the Third International between "capitalist" and "democratic" imperialisms, or insisting on reading the United States as the architect behind every war, obscures the material transformations shaping today's global reality.

This anti-imperialist vocabulary also dominated discussions of the war in Palestine. Many interpreted the unprecedented events of 7 October and the genocidal assault on Gaza as merely the latest phase in decades of occupation, apartheid, and violence. While this framework captured real elements, it also reproduced campist dynamics. It led some to imagine Iran and its regional allies as part of a shared anti-Zionist front—forgetting, in the process, the Kurdish and Iranian women's movements that have long insisted on struggles against patriarchy and exploitation that cannot be subsumed into geopolitics (Ferrari 2025).

The global mobilisations against the genocide in Gaza marked an important rupture in the confusion that had

gripped movements in this Third World War. Yet the categories of imperialism/anti-imperialism—and of colonialism/anti-colonialism—also reproduced schematics that, instead of enabling political opposition to war, reinforced the territorial imagination of state conflict and alliance. The old ideological trap—pitting Western "civilisation" against Eastern "barbarism," or reversing it into a global South resisting Western domination—kept movements within a territorial cage. Even when mobilisations for Gaza emerged simultaneously in multiple locations, even when people invoked a "new internationalism," this territorial cage fragmented the Third World War into isolated events and prevented recognition of specifically transnational possibilities.

This revived vocabulary has therefore failed to grasp the radical ruptures that have restructured global reality, particularly the disruptive force of living labour's behaviour. Although the category of imperialism can highlight power differentials between states and their attempts to pursue power politics, the main limitation of anti-imperialism is that it keeps states at the centre of political analysis—at a time when their role, while still important, is partial, unstable, and increasingly inconsistent.

Similar problems arise when "imperialism" is used to describe multinational corporations like Amazon. This tends to treat capital as an autonomous force, detached from its constitutive relation with living labour (Lazzarato 2022). Even notions like "political capitalism" (Aresu 2020), although they push back against crude ideas of "autocratic" vs. "market" capitalism, do not fully explain how the transnational constrains state sovereignty and short-circuits the effectiveness of state policies within the world market.

Likewise, the authoritarian turn visible even in liberal democracies should not be read as evidence that states have grown stronger. Rather, it is the clearest sign of their difficulty in exercising political command amid the disorder of the transnational (Grappi–Consolati 2023).

This analysis is not optimistic. It simply recognises that global processes have produced an increasing misalignment between state and capital—an impossibility of alignment that

is shaped not only by capital's dynamics but also by the active behaviours of living labour. For this reason, the transnational forces us to move beyond the dead ends of outdated analytical categories and to reopen the urgent question of class and organisation.

Multipolarism

This political question cannot be resolved—and may even be lost—within the current enthusiasm for "multipolarism." The term is now widespread in discussions of shifting international relations and changes in the global distribution of power. For state actors like Putin's Russia or Xi's China, multipolarism represents the promise of a new world order defined by the rise of powers such as the BRICS, capable of challenging U.S. hegemony.

Yet the adoption of multipolarism within parts of the global left (Ayoub 2023) raises important concerns. The campism evident in debates around Ukraine and Palestine does not find a meaningful alternative in multipolarism. Instead, multipolarism risks projecting an emancipatory image onto a geopolitical dynamic that, in practice, expresses an authoritarian turn within the transnational—one that suppresses the freedom of movement of living labour.

The intensification of racism and patriarchy within militarised democracies is mirrored by the conditions of exploitation and oppression in states that position multipolarism as the escape from last century's imperial order. Moreover, attempts to imagine more egalitarian geopolitical arrangements within a multipolar framework cannot articulate peace in any form other than as a relation between states, nor redistribution except through the national categories of the poles themselves.

Critical geopolitics, even when it avoids simplistic campism, sometimes proposes renewed connections between movements and institutions at regional scales. These analyses offer valuable tools for understanding international dynamics. But politically they risk reproducing images of class organisation that remain tied to state-mediated spatial scales—moving from local to national, national to regional (Mezzadra–Neilson 2024). They

underestimate how the transnational has materially transformed the state itself.

It is necessary, therefore, to understand multipolarism and regionalisms not as policy outputs of states but as political effects of global processes that reshape capital's valorisation and intersect with the movements of living labour. Only from this angle can historical internationalism be rethought in relation to the transnational.

Internationalism

The recent surge of appeals to internationalism revives a category that, despite its vagueness, carries strong historical associations. These associations can easily produce misleading analogies. Reevaluating historical internationalism requires distinguishing its inventive aspects from the ways it became constrained by national organisational forms—particularly during the two world wars.

The collapse of socialist parties during World War I and the trajectory of the Soviet Union produced the communist internationalism of the Third International. But this form of internationalism, tied to the mediation between state, party, and union, eventually limited living labour's movements. Even the antifascist internationalism of World War II operated within the framework of fronts and alliances that often subordinated struggles against racism, colonialism, and exploitation to national or geopolitical priorities.

Yet within these same historical periods, alternative forms of political communication emerged. Black militants in the United States, the Caribbean, and Africa refused to entrust the struggle against the fascist invasion of Ethiopia to the League of Nations or the Comintern. They rejected the mobilisation of Black populations into wars for democracies that simultaneously upheld segregation, colonial rule, and exploitation (James 1935; James 1939; International African Service Bureau 1939). Their movements exposed the limits of state-centred internationalism and demonstrated the possibility of transnational connections that escaped the logic of fronts.

This historical reference helps clarify what it means today to "break blocs"—including those produced by

uncritical invocations of internationalism. Without grounding it in the transnational, calls for a "new internationalism" risk reproducing the very political mediations that once constrained living labour, or falling back into multipolar campism.

At the same time, the proliferation of contemporary internationalisms—feminist, Indigenous, anti-colonial, Black, queer, ecological, and more (Çubukçu 2024)—reveals both the creativity and the fragmentation of today's struggles. These currents demonstrate how living labour has exploded the old homogeneous conception of class held by historical internationalism. Yet they also show how organisational questions have become enclosed within identity-based frameworks that can re-separate exploitation from oppression, production from reproduction.

In the context of the Third World War, a transnational politics cannot be built from the remnants of historical internationalism or the categories that have sedimented within state traditions or identity politics. These categories obscure the continuous movement of living labour and block the release of collective political force.

A transnational politics responds instead to the urgent need to create forms of organisation capable of activating the differences that constitute living labour—workers, precarious workers, women, LGBTQ+ people, migrants—within a transnational process of class composition. Such an organisation cannot emerge from alliances among existing structures that reaffirm their national or local identity. It can only arise in relation to the rejection of war, exploitation, and oppression that these subjects enact in their ongoing class struggle (STRIKE THE WAR)

3 State

Forms of command and paths of the living labour

Trying to understand how the THIRD WORLD WAR reshapes the state—as the primary institutional form through which capitalist domination is articulated and society is organised—means accepting the risk of real-time analysis. The Russian invasion of Ukraine not only shattered the illusion that Europe would "never again" see war; it also revived the anachronistic belief that the state has returned to sovereign command over its territory and over the spaces of capital. Images of Ukrainian trenches, of the military occupation of Gaza, and of the various forms of popular resistance active on both fronts seem to reconstruct a scene in which the state's space fully coincides with its people and its territory.

At the same time, strategies of economic decoupling, supply-chain de-risking, and the reshoring of production appear to signal a restoration of the relationship between state and capital that had been frayed by three decades of neoliberal globalisation. This apparent convergence—already foreshadowed during the pandemic—has reactivated debates about the changing relationship between state and capital. These discussions emphasise a supposed new centrality and relative autonomy of the state, grounded in its rediscovered role as guarantor of security and protection (both military and social), and in its renewed planning capacity in areas such as digitalisation, ecological transition, energy provisioning, and transnational care chains (Hunter–Khachaturian–Nanopoulos 2023; Gerbaudo 2021).

Yet—even if the pandemic and the Third World War have further entangled the national and the TRANSNATIONAL in what some perceive as a new global governmentality—this has not produced the unambiguous consolidation and centralisation of the state that war is often assumed to bring about. Such readings reassert the idea of the state as an entity

defined by its relationship to territory, people, or community—precisely the definition destabilised by transnational disorder.

Rather than asking what the state can still do once it is caught in transnational military, legal, economic, and administrative power relations, it is more useful to ask what is new in the articulation between state and capital. This means analysing the ongoing reconfiguration of the state as a "strategic field" (Demirović 2011)—a terrain on which some possibilities for action are redefined and others decisively foreclosed.

The State as articulation in process

We therefore treat the state as an articulation in process, examining specific changes in how it relates to capital and living labour. Our hypothesis is that, in the present conjuncture, we see emerging schemas—partial codifications—of the functions of command and government that we can associate with the state. To speak of the state as an articulation in process is to argue that this process is not fixed in a model, hierarchy, or stable institutional structure. It also shifts analytical attention away from the state as apparatus or legal-constitutional form and toward how transformations of the state redefine command over living labour and reshape the relationship between production and social reproduction.

Authoritarian populisms that have established themselves—or may do so—can accentuate particular aspects of this redefinition, but they are unlikely to change its overall direction unless entire constitutional arrangements are undermined by the consolidation of purely executive governance legitimised through permanent states of emergency. This was the attempt made during Trump's second term, after the "deconstruction of the federal state" had had little practical effect in his first presidency.

Within this framework, we argue that war produces a decisive qualitative leap in the misalignment between state and capital. This dynamic has roots in the 2007–2009 financial crisis and has been reshaped by cycles of struggle including Occupy and Blockupy, the Arab Springs, Ni Una

Menos and the feminist and transfeminist strike movement, the Yellow Vests, the George Floyd rebellion, the civil wars in Syria and the Donbass, and the pandemic—which further accelerated the need for new governance structures.

To speak of misalignment is not to suggest that the state becomes autonomous from capital or gains decisive control over its anonymous and alienating dynamics. Rather, misalignment designates shifting attempts to rearticulate a functional relationship between state and capital—a relationship whose rules are never fully stable or final. By misalignment we refer to the disconnection between the state's political–institutional–territorial dimension and the spatial dimension of capital's valorisation. This disconnection reveals the state's inability—or impossibility—to represent capital in its multiple articulations on a national scale.

Lines of valorisation

The misalignment between state and capital signals the irreversible crisis of their historical relationship. This crisis is driven both by capital's continual efforts to escape spatial limits and reshape the temporality of valorisation, and by the movements of living labour—especially its intensified mobility in search of better conditions and in rejection of hierarchical domination and the violence of war. Just as the state can no longer represent capital or govern accumulation within its own space, it also no longer functions as the institutional site where class struggle is consolidated. Class struggle continually exceeds the boundaries of the state.

It is the mobility and heterogeneity of living labour that destabilise a state confronted with women, men, and LGBTQ+ people who can no longer be identified as members of "its" people (Ricciardi 2025). In this sense, living labour disarticulates the relation between state space and state territory (Craig 2020).

The crisis of the overlap between state space and state territory does not equal the disappearance of sovereignty. Rather, it manifests as increasing incoherence in sovereignty's legal, administrative, and economic expressions—from the United States to the many regimes across Africa and the Middle East. The root of this

incoherence lies in the fracture between political-territorial arrangements and the space-time dynamics of valorisation. This fracture renders any semblance of order provisional. At the same time, it signals a radical transformation of the state in relation to valorisation (and thus to global value chains) and to social reproduction.

We might summarise this transformation—perhaps too bluntly—as a shift in the state's function from guarantor of social reproduction to protagonist of capitalist valorisation.

To understand how the state intervenes in valorisation processes, we must begin from the premise that there is no single mode of valorisation. There is a plurality of processes, and there is no longer—if there ever was—a sequential "before" of production and "after" of circulation and reproduction. To speak of the Amazonisation, logisticisation, or financialisation of capitalism risks isolating only one aspect of these processes rather than grasping their articulation. The Amazon model intersects with the Walmart model, the automotive model, the pervasive dual use of civil and military production, and various forms of financialisation with geographies and temporalities that do not always align.

For this reason, treating the state as an articulation in process means refusing recent attempts to conceptualise it simply as a platform or infrastructure. Just as we cannot think of the state solely as the physical, legal, and intellectual infrastructure that unifies or organises competition among individual capitals, imagining the state as a platform risks ignoring its specificity relative to other platforms with which it forms more or less functional relationships. The state remains an actor endowed with legal, military, policing, and decision-making capacities—capacities that retain legitimacy even if no longer backed by absolute monopoly.

From the perspective of capital, transnational dynamics draw a highly complex picture that resists unified representation. Strategies of reshoring, friendshoring, de-risking, and decoupling are not separate phenomena but varying expressions of how the state–capital articulation appears in different moments. Just as Trump's tariff rhetoric ran up against the impossibility of fully decoupling from China, a parallel impossibility appears at the monetary level.

The BRICS' aspiration to create their own currency remains fantasy in a world where, especially in a crisis phase such as the one opened by the Third World War, 80 percent of global transactions are conducted in dollars. Even the BRICS' New Development Bank finances most of its projects and investments in U.S. currency.

Executive and governance structures

If war is indeed a moment of "non-simultaneous" reorganisation of value chains, this reorganisation does not operate by simply cutting states out of global circuits. Recent levels of trade between the United States and China make this clear. But there is another crucial point: today, even the most powerful states can no longer be understood as mere regulators of investment. Instead, they actively shape the conditions under which investments are directed. In doing so, they become centres of gravity for an extended governance structure that links governments, public institutions, fractions of capital, multinational investors, think tanks, research centres, and knowledge-production networks.

This governance structure is dynamic rather than fixed, and it varies across contexts. The institutional forms through which the United States, the European Union, and China intervene in value chains differ sharply, yet their modes of action share certain features. Within these modes, relations of subordination, association, and cooperation emerge. The shared objective is to steer processes of capital valorisation that both exceed national territories and unfold at speeds incompatible with traditional domestic or foreign-policy timeframes. In this scenario, the state turns its own "incompleteness" into an operational resource, even as the linear sequence of decision, execution, and administration breaks down.

Political sovereignty, though formally monolithic, becomes central precisely because it enables states to assert rules whose concrete content is produced outside the state itself. Yet the constitution of the state is simultaneously placed under severe strain: crisis management repeatedly pushes states beyond constitutional limits, calling into question the coherence of their constitutional order. The

core issue is not simply that the state expresses its undemocratic character through emergency measures (Ackerman 2004). Rather, it is the mixed character of the actors involved in crisis management and the specific role the state assumes within these hybrid arrangements.

In the United States, this dynamic became visible both during the American banking crisis of 2023 (Svb, Signature Bank, First Republic Bank), when the state coordinated its response with financial powers such as JP Morgan, and in the implementation of major legislative packages such as the Infrastructure Act, the Chips and Science Act, and various financial stimuli. In all these cases, mixed state–capital task forces were created. What the state uniquely contributes within these governance structures is the capacity to insert decision-making and authority into their functioning. Because these structures lack grounding in formal law, their creation relies on extra-constitutional instruments: memoranda, proclamations, executive orders. This is not far from the increasingly common rule-by-decree in many European states, where the concentration of power in the executive underscores the authoritarian function required to sustain these transformations as the state's democratic mediation erodes.

This crisis unfolds not only internally but also at the supranational level. Governments remain in constant tension with European institutions: they recognise their own inadequacy in confronting transnational capitalism and contemporary war scenarios, yet resist the treaty reforms needed to redefine the EU's political, economic, and military priorities. The call for "enhanced governance" in the recent Draghi report on European competitiveness seeks to bypass these tensions by relocating decisions on power and resource distribution to another institutional level.

China's system functions in a partially analogous way: its state machinery depends on a performative decision-making capacity to avert crises that always seem imminent — a capacity incompatible with democratic or popular procedures. Instead of focusing on the supposed transition from a party-State to a State-party (Wang 2016), the emphasis should be on how capitalist governance has been structured

through coastal special economic zones, the Belt and Road Initiative, and the developmental goals of Made in China 2025. Within China's competitive governance across regions, metropolitan areas, and special economic zones, capital valorisation and political authority have been rearticulated (Lan 2024). But these articulations are not free of conflict, as the pandemic revealed in tensions between local and central levels. The party's mediating and distributive role operates within capitalist valorisation processes themselves. Social control — via the credit system and permitted apps — is largely exercised by local governments. What emerges, then, is a hybrid statehood linking metropolitan areas with central state apparatuses. Yet in moments of acute crisis of valorisation, the Standing Committee of the Communist Party retains indisputable decision-making power.

Thus, the common depiction of a global conflict between Western liberal capitalism and Eastern political capitalism (including Russia) is unconvincing (Milanović 2019). This framing renders the autonomy of the political absolute on both sides, disconnecting it from the class composition of living labour, the hierarchies of social cooperation, and the reproduction of social relations.

Decomposed territories

If the accelerated tempos of valorisation and the need to resolve its blockages have pushed the state toward increasingly authoritarian forms, the transnational character of these processes also undermines the territorial foundations of the state. Global value chains generate continuous processes of "de- and re-territorialisation": the constitution and decomposition of state space that no longer correspond to borders clearly marking internal order from external disorder. These borders weaken under the influence of dispersed power structures.

More specifically, these dynamics challenge the image of state territory as a homogeneously governed space. Global value chains reconfigure spatial and temporal relations: they stretch spaces, compress times, and destabilise multiscalar readings of the transnational. Time enters space, synchronising production and social reproduction processes

that were previously sequential or spatially separate.

The growing frictions between the U.S. federal government and individual states, and the complex, multilayered conflicts between EU institutions and member states, illustrate the crisis of territory as a unified state space. Viewed from the perspective of valorisation's geographies, territories break into zones governed by heterogeneous logics and characterised by divergent lifestyles and collective behaviours. Across U.S. and European metropolitan regions and Chinese and Indian special economic zones, we see clusters of finance, technology, communications, and knowledge that grant multinational corporations and international agencies powers equal to or greater than those of states.

This is a "differentiated government of the national territory" (Ong 2006) whose autonomy is not legally codified but emerges procedurally through the imposition of specific jurisdictions. As a result, political command becomes hybrid: at once governmental, disciplinary, and jurisdictional, yet constrained by constant mediation and coordination across public and private, state, supra-state, and regional actors. These hybrid assemblages operate across transnational spaces and times that cannot be reduced to multiscalar frameworks of territory or accumulation.

Within this radically transformed environment, the question becomes how the state — now an ongoing articulation rather than a unified entity — socialises war beyond ideological MILITARISM or the large-scale reallocation of resources from social to military spheres. The state's shift from guarantor of social reproduction to an actor directly engaged in valorisation, combined with the loss of national-scale mediation between capital and labour, fundamentally changes how war becomes socialised. It reshapes class composition in ways different from the past.

The disarticulation of the "citizen-worker" (Mezzadra-Neilson 2013), aligned with the dismantling of twentieth-century welfare regimes, transforms the terrain of social reproduction as a site for the subjectivation of living labour. What matters is less the disappearance of social protections than their radical reorganisation. As the pandemic

demonstrated, the state cannot abandon minimal welfare provisions without jeopardising the reproduction of capitalist social relations. Yet alongside these minimal forms, we see an expanding landscape of corporate welfare (varying by firm), financialised welfare (a rapidly growing insurance sector), and voluntary welfare (NGOs and the third sector), which provides basic services to targeted populations from Western cities to post-colonial peripheries. These forms do not consolidate into a coherent system. Instead, they generate uneven articulations between living labour and welfare, reshaping political communisation and the transmission of struggles. Social reproduction thus amplifies and produces deep differences, limiting the possibility for subjects to recognise shared elements of exploitation.

War as a process of socialisation

The crisis of state sovereignty — understood here as the crisis of its capacity to generate societal unity through shared values — manifests in culture wars, in the dissociation between electoral behaviour and positions on abortion, immigration, wages, welfare, and war itself. These dynamics restrict the possibility of building broad oppositions. Instead of traditional militaristic ideology aimed at fostering national unity, the state uses war rhetorically while embedding the logic of a Third World War inside society itself. This logic constructs a permanent internal enemy: newcomers or irregular MIGRANTS, women or trans people depicted as threatening gender order, so-called minorities perceived as destabilising racial hierarchies, CLIMATE CONFLICTS that contest the imperatives of valorisation, and living labour resisting the minimal wage floor.

This logic does not resemble class struggle. Rather, it activates a logic of enmity that obscures or even negates processes of radical subjectivation and RESISTANCE. By assembling temporary alignments against temporary enemies, it produces identity-based outcomes and blocks the identification of shared conditions and the construction of transversal solidarities. This problem extends beyond individual national societies and permeates the global arena of states, where it underpins campist logics.

Globally, states engaged in the Third World War are undergoing a transition without historical precedent and without generating homogenisation across political-institutional forms. In this disjointed conjuncture, political regimes have emerged which, despite their differences, ground their political, social, military, and religious reproduction in resisting international disorder, transforming colonial domination into apartheid (in DECOLONIAL terms), and turning ethnic pluralism into territorial fragmentation. Caught between statehood and liberation movements, these regimes inhabit an authoritarian and patriarchal limbo that severely constrains, and often blocks, liberation-oriented social subjectivation.

If crisis, pandemic, and war are shaping the future history of states in real time, then forms of social insubordination — undisciplined political movements such as those emerging from migrant labour, and the struggles of living labour against exploitation — are not only obstacles to this trajectory. They also open paths that create and transform subjects who refuse alignment with either state power or transnational capital.

4 Militarism

An ideology of social reproduction

Militarism is the ideology of the THIRD WORLD WAR. It reshapes social relations by extending the effects of war far beyond the territories and fronts where fighting occurs. Militarism identifies all those who seek to escape domination and exploitation as enemies; it asserts the incontestability of hierarchies and the unquestionability of authority; and it subordinates collective intellect and cooperation to the disciplines of merit and competition.

It functions as a discourse of order that opposes the claims of the precarious, of women, and of MIGRANTS by normalising war and presenting it as a permanent horizon that demands economic, social, and human sacrifices. Militarism is thus the armed reiteration of the neoliberal mantra there is no alternative, imposing what Luxemburg (1898) called "the cadaverous obedience of the soldier" on those who continue to struggle for another possible world.

Militarism attempts to dictate the terms of class struggle. Therefore, the critique of militarism requires identifying its material effects on living labour, and acknowledging that the Third World War has intensified the authoritarian and conservative dimensions of neoliberalism, increasingly legitimising violence as a resource for producing order—however temporary.

Partial mobilisation and fragmentation

We must distinguish militarism from militarisation. Militarism does not necessarily imply that society becomes organised like an army. Rather, militarist ideology conveys a specific discipline of behaviour and legitimises hierarchies against those who challenge them, employing nationalism, patriarchy, and racism as weapons. Even if the Third World War does not produce total mobilisation everywhere,

militarism addresses the political need to mobilise the workforce—ideologically and materially—in support of war and its military, productive, and reproductive requirements. European rearmament plans, embraced in the wake of Trump's "peace" announcement, and the ongoing debate in many EU states about reintroducing compulsory military service must be read against the background of an irreversible rupture in the link between nationality, citizenship, and labour. This link, which structured the First and Second World Wars in different ways, has now been reinscribed within neoliberal and individualised forms of access to rights.

Historically, debates about participation in the war effort opened deep rifts within labour, feminist, and anticolonial movements (Luxemburg 1898; Pankhurst 1919, 1932; James 1939). Throughout the twentieth century, the consolidation of the nexus between nationality, citizenship, and labour enabled proletarians, women, and Black people to gain civil, political, and social rights through participation in war. Mass conscription, on the other hand, constituted the "people" willing to die for the fatherland, dissolving class antagonism under the supposed homogeneity of uniforms (Liebknecht 1907). Today, very little remains of the patriotic imperatives of that period. Citizenship has been emptied of social content and deprived of even its formal universalism. War, where it is fought, no longer relies on general conscription but on mobilisation organised through wage hierarchies (De Luca 2024). The logic of the enemy, which is implied in every call to defend the homeland, cannot produce a homogeneous internal front inflamed by patriotism. Living labour refuses to become dead labour.

The exponential rise in desertion in Russia and Ukraine illustrates an unwillingness to sacrifice that can only be overcome through coercion, as shown by the criminalisation of pacifists and the round-ups of deserters on both sides. The other side of coercion is the redefinition of voluntary service as a pathway to individual or identity-based self-valorisation: Polish truck drivers can earn more in military service than private logistics; women and LGBTQ+ people in Ukraine may seek recognition of their identities and hoped-for

compensation during reconstruction; migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, or East Asia can obtain citizenship by enlisting in Russian, Ukrainian, or Israeli forces—citizenship that grants them not social rights, but merely freedom of movement.

Militarist propaganda is now entering schools in several European states. The "Scandinavian moment" of school-based military training is promoted to select, through market-like competition, which boys and girls are eligible for conscription. In this context, militarism—which spreads even where war is not directly fought within the Third World War—presses people who have nothing to gain from fighting to do so. Militarism is an ideology that justifies the demand for sacrifice, reproduces sexist, racist, and class hierarchies within conscription markets, and disguises fragmented citizenship under the democratic rhetoric of self-empowerment.

Patriarchy, violence, authoritarianism

Militarism reinforces the patriarchal premises of accumulation and social reproduction—precisely those challenged by the feminist movements of the last decade. Russia's invasion of Ukraine immediately activated the material and symbolic order of male entitlement necessary to justify a waged war and to sustain the reproduction of life under conditions of austerity and impoverishment—conditions whose burdens fall overwhelmingly on women.

The Russian government's promotion of patriotic motherhood is not just a revival of an outdated nationalist ideal. Rather, it embodies an impossible patriotism and a wounded patriarchy, enforced through the violent repression of women and mothers who oppose the war. On the other side, the European Union's self-congratulatory celebration of its "democratic welcome" of Ukrainian women and children has reproduced hierarchies between white and Black migrants, and reduced these women to passive victims in need of protection. This patriarchal framing erased the centrality of their labour in war-ravaged Ukraine and in post-Soviet societies, which have been devastated first by neoliberalism and now by war. Similarly, their labour has long

borne the weight of monetised and privatised welfare in European societies (Lyubchenko 2022).

Within militarist discourse, sexual freedom is coded in contradictory ways. It may be elevated as a value that the democratic West must defend with arms against authoritarian or fundamentalist enemies, with gender-inclusive militaries being presented as proof of harmless, domesticated gender equality. This requires feminism itself to be domesticated—rendering it obedient and transforming it into a war-ready "foreign policy." Conversely, sexual freedom may be regulated by measures that strengthen the family, which is financed solely by wages and unpaid domestic and care work under market rules, as the proper site of reproduction. Alternatively, sexual freedom may be directly repressed by identifying its practitioners as enemies who threaten the "natural" order of sexual hierarchies and gender roles. This is why, in Trump's America, even the domesticated inclusion of women and LGBTQ+ people in the military has been reversed. Military discipline overlaps with sexual discipline: rising male desertion in both Ukraine and Russia is increasingly interpreted not simply as betrayal of the nation but as betrayal of the masculine mandate imposed by war.

Militarism legitimises the right of the strongest not only in the confrontation between armies but also within social institutions and in everyday relations. While militarism is not the cause of increasing male violence against women, it participates in the same logic that has long made rape a weapon of war—symbolically destroying the enemy by exerting domination over women's bodies. Militarist ideology activates what Segato (2024) calls a "pedagogy of cruelty," establishing violence as a legitimate and necessary strategy for maintaining order and punishing those who claim freedom against oppression. This pedagogy is not confined to the introduction of militarist propaganda in schools; it is embedded in the broader normalisation of violence in a response to insubordination. Such a normalisation has long been prepared by decades of border militarisation, which has treated the deaths of millions of migrants as an acceptable cost of unrestrained freedom of movement. This culminates in the genocidal and racist violence through which the State

of Israel continues to annihilate Palestinian life. While war differentiates between spaces where it is fought and those where it is not—through differing levels of violence—militarism renders violence perpetually possible, legitimate, and necessary to preserve an increasingly fragile order. It dismantles the remaining barriers, however symbolic, that once constrained its deployment—for example, those represented by human rights discourse.

Militarism is therefore tied to the intensification of authoritarianism and state intervention that characterise the Third World War. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine—and even more brutally amid the genocide in Palestine—militarism has asserted the indisputable legitimacy of war and of its political rationality. Militarism portrays war not as aggression but as defence against existential threats: threats to territorial integrity, to the destiny of an "elect" people, or to a "way of life" or "prosperity," as invoked by Draghi, von der Leyen, and Rutte in response to Trump's assertion that Russia has a strategic advantage in the pacification of Ukraine. Militarism manifests not only in arms races but also in expanded censorship, repression, and expulsions targeting those who oppose the war, whether in war zones or globally. It also shapes national security policies that enlarge police powers while shrinking the political space available to social movements. While it is correct to frame these interventions as violations of constitutional freedoms, this risks relying on the same criteria used to reproduce the distinction between "democratic" and "authoritarian" regimes—a distinction that serves to justify war. Authoritarianism is not exclusive to neo-fascist or sovereigntist groups, although the war provides fertile ground for their rise. Rather, militarism reveals how authoritarianism has seeped into democracy itself, becoming the imprint of its neoliberal and belligerent form. Thus the Third World War provides an opportunity to control living labour and prevent opposition to war from linking itself to struggles for higher wages, income, sexual freedom, and freedom of movement.

A political regulator

Militarism does not entail total mobilisation or the fully

militarised war economies of the twentieth century. National economies are not subject to military law, even in areas of conflict, because each STATE now operates within unpredictable TRANSNATIONAL dynamics that prevent them from exercising full sovereignty over economic decision-making. While militarism seeks to reduce spaces for struggle and organisation, it simultaneously transforms war into a field of profit. In the context of the Third World War, control over capital and command over living labour are reconfigured, with militarism operating as an ideology that functions as a "political regulator" (Liebknecht 1907). By saturating both public and private spheres with the logic of war, it reshapes industrial and social policies, redefining the conditions of production and reproduction and recalibrating power relations between capital and labour.

The redirection of social spending toward defence investment (Rutte 2024) and the declaration of "readiness" for war to confront "transnational challenges such as rapid technological change, migration, or climate change" (European Defence Agency 2025) are part of a geopolitical strategy that sets the economic parameters of a societal politics (CLIMATE CONFLICTS). The global arms race—pursued by Europe, China, Russia, the UK, and NATO—does not necessarily indicate preparation for direct war, although this remains a possibility. Nor is it merely about expanding stockpiles. Rather, it is about establishing an integrated defence market that provides greater access to raw materials, financial capital, infrastructure, scientific knowledge, technological innovation, and, crucially, living labour. Representing war as an impending inevitability comprehensively redefines the conditions of capital accumulation and workers' exploitation.

For this reason, universities, think tanks, and start-ups—whose role is increasingly framed around the valorisation of "dual use" technologies—become central actors for ensuring military effectiveness on the battlefield while preserving competitiveness (European Commission 2024). Militarism regiments the general intellect: regulating universities and research enhances knowledge production for the war-orientated market economy while implicitly or

explicitly legitimising war. War privileges technocratic problem-solving, disciplines research labour through meritocratic competition, and governs cooperation by fragmenting knowledge production and precarising research labour. Student mobilisations for Palestine that have demanded an end to dual use have therefore identified a central mechanism of capitalist war valorisation. However, it is no longer possible to distinguish between military and civil applications of knowledge when industrial policy is comprehensively regulated by war. Nor is it sufficient to support academic boycotts against Israeli institutions responsible for technological innovation used in genocide. The liberation of knowledge from its warlike application requires confronting the structural entanglement between war, industrial policies, and the redefinition of the world market—and broadening the horizon of struggle to include subjects far beyond universities.

Militarism also legitimises shifting public resources from social expenditure to defence, reversing the pandemic-era wage and income supports that briefly allowed millions of precarious women to escape partial compulsion to work. But it is not enough to simply demand a different allocation of resources, as if the state fully governed them. Even if states remain key actors in the Third World War, the war's dynamics coincide with those of a TRANSNATIONAL disorder that no state can sovereignly manage. Addressing the state as mediator means moving solely on a national terrain—the same terrain occupied by far-right movements that call for "higher wages and fewer weapons," on the condition that migrants remain excluded or deported en masse. On this terrain, racism can be sold as a pro-labour policy, reinforcing the fragmentation that prevents the convergences of living labour (Gambino 2003) necessary to counter impoverishment—something the right has never truly opposed. The key issue is that investment in arms and defence reshapes the "material relations of reproduction" (Luxemburg 1913). Defence spending generates profit without increasing employment, social wealth, or wages—indeed, it further erodes all three through intensified attacks on welfare, now presented as an unavoidable wartime necessity.

The Third World War is the arena in which the power relations between capital and living labour are being forcefully redefined to the detriment of precarious workers, women, and migrants. We must acknowledge the increasing mismatch between the state and capital, as well as the open crisis of democratic mediation that states once managed in the mid-twentieth century. The militarism and authoritarianism embedded in Western democracies have brought this crisis to fruition. Our task is to reverse the power relations that the Third World War seeks to consolidate in favour of capital by bringing our anti-war organisation up to the level of the transnational upheaval whose provisional governance the war is attempting to impose.

Against the logic of the enemy

We must reject militarism in all its forms, freeing our struggles from the logic of the enemy through which militarism seeks to override them. When war is waged as a permanent threat based on the identification of an external enemy, states become the uncontested protagonists of wartime politics, dispossessing workers, precarious people, migrants, women, and LGBTQ+ people of their capacity for political initiative. Treating this initiative as hostility serves to suppress the movements that disrupt the unity of the "home front" demanded by war and to legitimise the violence required to impose it.

The deeper problem is that the logic of the enemy has also infected our own movements, without generating any identifiable "side" capable of opposing the Third World War. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, campism has become the ideological form of militarism within social movements. The mere identification of an enemy—US empire, Ukrainian Nazism, or the State of Israel—has been sufficient for some to cast the Russian government or the so-called Axis of Resistance as allies. This compact portrayal of fronts—even when unintentionally reinforced by the language of RESISTANCE—has erased the experiences of millions of Russian and Ukrainian proletarians suffering violence and deprivation. It has silenced women resisting war under clandestine conditions, and ignored Israelis who risked

repression to oppose genocide in Palestine. It has dismissed Palestinians who fled the Gaza massacres rather than take up arms, neglected the migrant workers killed or taken hostage on 7 October, and eventually marginalised the struggles of women and LGBTQ+ people who refuse subjugation—whether imposed through political Islamism or Zionism. Feminist movements, too, have been drawn into the logic of war, fractured along an imagined divide between "Western feminism" and "DECOLONIAL feminism"—a divide sharpened since 2022 and rendered even more acute after 7 October. These fractures regard the relationship between national or territorial self-determination and women's liberation, and whether the latter must be temporarily subordinated to the former. Rejecting this renewed form of campism does not mean dictating to women or LGBTQ+ people under bombardment what they should or should not do (STRIKE THE WAR). Rather, it means depriving war of its authority to set political priorities and reasserting women's liberation and the struggle against racist patriarchy as the indispensable horizon of a peace that cannot be founded on their oppression, on the multiplication of militarised borders, or on the pacification of their struggles (Dalla Negra 2021; Jin, Jiyan, Azadî as in Free Palestine 2023).

Rejecting militarism and the logic of the enemy does not imply equidistance. It means standing with those fighting not to be oppressed or exploited, while recognising that the fronts are never unified and that the "people"—supposedly rendered homogeneous by national, ethnic, or religious identity, or by a practice of resistance—are traversed by power relations and antagonisms. These are the lines along which opposition to war must be articulated. Above all, rejecting militarism and its logic of the enemy means acknowledging that our side is not predetermined. Our side must be constructed through an anti-war struggle that rejects the compulsion to work imposed by the war, the patriarchal and racist hierarchies it reinforces, and the violence and authoritarianism it normalises in the attempt to convince precarious workers, women, and migrants that there is no alternative.

5 Migrants

Movements in the storm of war

The management of the Ukrainian–EU border in late February 2022—just days after the Russian invasion—constituted both an exceptional moment and a paradigmatic illustration of how migrant movements and migration policies operate within the THIRD WORLD WAR. The mass flight of millions of Ukrainians extraordinarily forced European states to open their borders, activating a Treaty clause not even used during the Syrian refugee crisis of 2015. Positioning itself as the vanguard of a democratic West at war against authoritarianism, the EU welcomed millions of Ukrainian women and children, granting them an unprecedented "temporary protection" status. Yet, on the very same border, Ukrainian men attempting to flee were forced back and condemned to fight under the stigma of desertion, while African and Asian migrants—fleeing the same bombs—were stranded for days. Within months, Ukrainian women who had initially represented Europe's humanitarian generosity were instead pushed into poverty, exploitation, and institutional racism, channelled into care work or other low-paid and low-skilled jobs. In the decisive months following the Russian attack, racism, patriarchy, and the demands of war reasserted themselves as the key criteria for selecting, containing, and governing the movement of migrant men and women within the broader logic of the Third World War.

Over the three years since the invasion, the war and the multiplication of fronts have intensified conflicts in territories already shaped by mass movements of refugees and migrant workers. Men and women have fled destroyed cities in search of safety and autonomy, unwilling to be pulled into nationalist or patriarchal appeals to RESISTANCE. Migrants have often faced the highest costs, treated as collateral damage within an existential clash that erases any distinctions. This was evident in the forgotten fate of Asian

migrants working in Israel who were killed or captured by Hamas on 7 October. In some cases, states directly involved in these conflicts have even attempted to deploy migrant men to the front, offering citizenship as a reward for fighting in someone else's war: Russia sent refugees from Somalia, Iraq, and various Arab countries to the front, while the Israeli government sought to persuade 30,000 Sudanese fleeing civil war to join its military efforts. The global effects of the Third World War have also reignited nationalism and violence far from the battlefields, triggering the resurgence of civil wars—such as the ongoing conflict in Sudan—that continue to produce deaths, instability, ecological destruction, and millions of displaced people moving toward Egypt and Europe.

The Third World War thus exposes, with even greater clarity, the disorder generated by the ungovernable desire of women and men to move for a better life. This disorder has fuelled an authoritarian political shift driven by the promise of new forms of control, oppression, and exploitation of migrants and women. Since the beginning of the war, states and supra-state institutions have deployed the entire repertoire of institutional racism to govern migrant lives and labour. Their aims are threefold: to regiment migrants' movement, to convert migrants into an "internal enemy" blamed for the material consequences of the war, and to respond to the production and reproduction needs generated by MILITARISM. This is not to argue that institutional racism originates in the Third World War (Toscano 2023). Nevertheless, the new scenario has decisively reconfigured the battleground between mass migrant movements and the efforts of states, institutions, and capital to channel these movements according to racist, warlike, and neoliberal logics—not by blocking mobility, but by dividing, sorting, and disciplining living labour according to the needs of production and reproduction.

Strategic racism

In recent years, the cross-border movements of migrants have become a decisive factor in reshaping the relationship between state and capital. At the same time, these

movements have fostered new modes of interaction among the various actors seeking to impose their instruments and logics of coercion on migrants (Mezzadra—Ricciardi 2013). On one side, recruitment agencies and private intermediaries (Sacchetto—Andrijasevic 2017), as well as supranational institutions such as the EU, have expanded their role. On the other, the STATE—already challenged by the mobility of both capital and migrants (Ricciardi 2025)—has reasserted itself as a politically empowered actor capable of deploying surplus racist and patriarchal violence, even as it dismantles welfare systems and renounces its responsibility to ensure social reproduction for its citizens. Militarism has further legitimised already well-established systems of institutional racism, intensifying practices of exploitation, confinement, deportation, and blackmail. The "pedagogy of cruelty" (Segato 2024) and the normalisation of violence against migrants have thus become increasingly central to the redefinition of global capitalist relations. Racism in migration policy has been fully subordinated to the attempt by states and capital to reassert command over a TRANSNATIONAL field that cannot be stabilised into any lasting regime.

Within this dynamic, the triple alliance of authoritarianism, militarism, and racism has played a crucial role in managing the political, economic, and social effects of ongoing conflicts far from the frontlines. Migrants are framed as additional enemies to be fought and as the scapegoats for the widespread fear towards a transnational dimension that continually brings war and its effects within national borders, through inflation, impoverishment, austerity, and soaring military spending. The far right has capitalised on these dynamics, promising an armed peace whose corollaries are deportations, border walls, and new hierarchies backed by systems of coercive obedience imposed on migrants. Even Trump's aggressively warmongering "peace" project proceeds through authoritarian restrictions on freedom of movement and work, enforced by executive orders. In the few weeks since his election, his administration has already escalated arrests of "irregular" migrants, suspended asylum application assessments, cut refugee reception funding, expanded deportations under wartime presidential powers,

and tightly coupled border militarisation with trade war strategies. Across Europe, the German far right's opposition to sending weapons and soldiers to Ukraine aligns seamlessly with its promise of "remigration" for Ukrainians, Syrians, and any migrants deemed illegal.

It is therefore not a coincidence that the von der Leyen plan for European rearmament appears alongside the Commission's announcement of new EU repatriation rules. These are meant not just to restrict or even prevent entry but also to subject uncooperative migrants to detention and establish repatriation hubs in third countries. Both initiatives emerge from the ascendant militarist ideology. Simultaneously, a tightening authoritarian grip constrains migrants' organisational capacities and translates the logic of war into an "internal front." Across Belgium, Italy, and beyond, repressive measures—including Italy's *Decreto Sicurezza*—criminalise migrants and target their organisational spaces: logistics warehouses, reception and repatriation centres, universities, and public squares where migrants and second-generation Arabs or Muslims have mobilised in protest, including against the genocide in Palestine. Through repression and subordination, the state attempts to reassert the authority and credibility it has lost in the economic realm.

This seemingly arbitrary, unrestrained violence functions as an effective means to reduce the political visibility of migrants' struggles, undermining their organisational practices—especially the strike—that had enabled migrant workers to assert themselves as a collective force within a mass and diffuse political terrain (Cobbe—Grappi 2011). At the same time, this violence directly worsens migrants' material and social conditions. Cast as burdens on public budgets and threats to citizens' jobs, migrants have become targets of "welfare chauvinism" (Gargiulo—Morlicchio—Tuorto 2024), which symbolically compensates for austerity policies affecting everyone by excluding some. In Belgium, where the right-wing government plans to allocate 2% of GDP to military spending while cutting €22 billion in public spending, migrants are denied access to social security during their first five years in the country. In

Poland, after receiving millions of Ukrainian women, the government reduced aid and insisted the country is not and will not become multicultural—ignoring the fact that millions of Ukrainians already work in factories and warehouses in Poland for German companies. In Austria, subsidies are conditioned on migrants performing unpaid "charitable" work and acquiring Austrian "values," with sanctions—including subsidy cuts—applied to those who refuse.

The other side of this militarist and racist ideology is the patriarchal violence that war directs against migrant women. In wartime, rape and gendered violence become ever-present risks. The Third World War reinforces the sexual and racial division of labour as a necessary complement to the defence of national power and the patriarchal family order—a compensatory structure that fills the void left by gutted welfare systems redirected toward defence spending. Everywhere, migrant women face intensified labour inside and outside the home, in worsening conditions, often bound to intermittent and impoverished care work. Their residence permits are frequently tied to fathers or husbands, and they are systematically excluded from welfare or forced to pay exorbitantly for it. In Italy, for example, the Meloni government praises family, fertility, and national solidarity while excluding migrant families resident for less than two years from child benefits.

Patriarchal racism thus constructs migrants as enemies both at the borders and within national societies. Its effects are twofold: it fragments struggles and movements, and it consolidates the material and symbolic power of a state that uses migrant bodies to demonstrate its residual capacity for coercion and to project itself as credible, authoritative, and even fearsome. These cruel policies are closely linked to the attempts of states and capital to reassert control over capitalist dynamics and the transnational movements of labour which are disrupted by war-driven policies. Racism and the logic of the internal enemy produce increasingly poor, precarious, and vulnerable migrant labour, while the dismantling of welfare and the social effects of war reinforce the compulsion to work for everyone.

Mobility policies

The elements of migration policy that attract the most media and electoral attention—border militarisation, deaths at sea, assaults on asylum rights, and "externalisation"—must also be understood within this broader context.

Externalisation practices—whereby governments and the EU enlist dictators and torturers to police migration flows—now intersect with new trajectories of capitalist exploitation within the Third World War. These practices are embedded in large-scale intervention and investment programmes, such as the Italian government's Mattei Plan, and in "strategic partnerships." A paradigmatic example is the multi-billion-euro agreement between the EU and Egypt. Weakened by the global socio-economic fallout of the war in Ukraine, destabilised by Israel's genocidal war in Gaza, and overwhelmed by refugees fleeing the Sudanese civil war, Egypt positioned its role as border enforcer in exchange for investments in energy transition projects. These negotiations rested on the promise that greener capitalism, climate stability, and general economic and political security could stem departures. The freedom to migrate was effectively exchanged for capital's freedom to invest in solar and wind mega-projects in the desert and to exploit the cheap labour of those now unable to migrate (CLIMATE CONFLICTS).

It is essential to stress that this growing arbitrary power over migrants does not signal a desire to permanently "seal off" societies or dispense with migrant labour. Data on migration flows in what is still misleadingly called "Fortress Europe" shows that the continent is far from impermeable. Restrictions on arrivals and normalised violence against migrants coexist with a proliferation of protocols, bilateral agreements, and decrees aimed at regulating and disciplining labour mobility for orderly exploitation—both regular and irregular (Garrapa 2024). At the same time, even in a right-wing Europe, various economic sectors, including semiconductor manufacturers, openly warn that anti-migration policies undermine competitiveness and growth. They therefore advocate for "just-in-time" and "to-the-point" migration channels geared toward both specialised and highly qualified labour. The EU explicitly recognises the

importance of a mobile, flexible, low-wage labour force at all levels of the value chain when it comes to competitiveness in terms of military and industrial production (Draghi 2024). Therefore, migrant labour and selective border openings remain crucial tools for reconfiguring transnational value chains and responding to the production and reproduction needs shaped by the disorder of war.

Within this framework, the mobility of workers becomes a decisive political battleground. States and capital value labour mobility as a mechanism for precarisation, fragmentation, and labour coercion—effects that extend far beyond migrant labour itself. What they seek to avoid, however, is that autonomous mobility translates into permanence in the societies of arrival—especially when those societies are dismantling social rights and welfare even for citizens—or that mobility becomes a form of social power capable of disrupting the regularity of exploitation and labour compulsion (Alberti—Sacchetto 2024). This is especially urgent as wartime conditions have intertwined the movements of workers and capital, particularly in Eastern Europe.

From this perspective, the attack on the right to asylum aims at suppressing migrants' autonomous mobility. In Europe, since the signing of the Pact on Migration and Asylum on the eve of the 2024 European elections—dominated by debates on defence, rearmament, and migration flows—the assault on asylum has become the central theme of numerous successful right-wing campaigns. Although its effects are still unfolding, the Pact provides member states with instruments destined to create detention centres for men, women, and children; sophisticated screening systems; extraterritorial border zones beyond EU law where racist violence can operate freely; and accelerated procedures for people from "safe" countries, even when these are ruled by dictators. Celebrated as a historic breakthrough, the Pact has become a key driver of the EU's shift to the right, legitimising governments to harden migration policies by exploiting terror attacks, media events, and wartime narratives. In Germany, the far right's securitarian discourse now finds cross-party resonance. In Eastern Europe, denunciations of

the Pact's inadequacy have raised the racist threshold by demanding continuous derogations from EU border rules. In February, Tusk's liberal government in Poland passed a law temporarily suspending the right to asylum and enabling expulsions on the grounds that migrants arriving from Belarus are a "hybrid war" weapon wielded by Minsk and Moscow.

Rights and deportations

This attack on the right to asylum is first and foremost a vicious attack on the millions of men and women who are fleeing massacres and crises in the Third World War, cynically conducted by the very same governments that carry out and encourage war. As in the past, it is an unconditional assault on the legal instrument that migrants have used en masse over the years to enter and stay in Europe in the absence of other channels, forcing legal boundaries and attempts to distinguish between refugees and "economic migrants." Simultaneously, this attack on asylum rights is an offensive against all forms of unregulated labour mobility because these undermine the aim of migration policies, which is to control the orderly availability of the labour force through compulsion to work and quick replacement. It is no coincidence that family reunification is the new polemical target of many European governments, from France to Italy, and from Germany to the United Kingdom. The explicit aim is to make it more difficult for migrants to settle in countries of arrival, thus increasing their blackmail and their status as a disposable labour force.

Significantly, the political value of this attack on asylum has now expanded to the extent that it has become a site of experimenting with practices and instruments whose extend far beyond the mere governance of migration. Attacking asylum has definitively accelerated the long-term erosion of the functions of international and humanitarian law, highlighting their blunted character, their inability to regulate conflicts and to act as a guarantor of rights and mediations within a framework marked by the war's growing legitimacy.

This is the result of two distinct but converging

processes. Firstly, the seemingly paradoxical reduction of procedures and selection criteria for accessing asylum. The excessive production of local, national or supranational regulations aimed at circumscribing, limiting and defining as much as possible the criteria for asylum dilutes its value as a universal right and its guaranteed elements, to the point where it becomes just another instrument for governing migration. This became apparent in the aftermath of the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, when European governments – the same ones that a few months earlier had called for the normalisation of diplomatic relations with the dictator to initiate deportations of Syrians – halted the movement of millions of refugees in Europe by threatening to suspend the procedures for the recognition of refugee status and even the repatriation of those who had already obtained it.

Secondly, this process of emptying proceeds through the continuous production and use of waivers and exceptions, which are deployed to overstep the procedural and substantive rigidities of legal practice and judicial intervention. These constraints are indeed inadequate to the demands of governing mobility and are seen as obstacles that can slow down decision-making processes, which must be swift in order to meet the need of valorisation. Consider the concrete threats of immediate "deportation" of migrants, dubbed as the "new frontier" of migration management. Examples range from Trump's 'mass deportation,' to the AfD's "repatriation" proposal, Labour's policies in Great Britain and the Italian government's programme of systematic deportation of asylum seekers to Albania, which has been praised by the European Commission and many member states. From this perspective, the Italian-Albanian pact has become a proper laboratory of techniques and rhetoric that circumvent domestic rules and international law. In fact, it has resulted in a political and juridical confrontation between the government and national and supranational courts. What is at stake in this confrontation is not so much the balance of the Italian constitutional order as the further shifting of the legitimate threshold of violence and arbitrariness that can be exercised over migrants. This shift is achieved by overruling the principles enshrined in international law and the

possibility of making political decisions despite the opposition of the courts.

If migration thus reaffirms mobility as a terrain of confrontation, then the violence and arbitrariness deployed against migrants become instruments in a broader attempt to re-establish command over living labour, which is continually challenged by freedom of movement. The militarisation of borders, attacks on the right to asylum, and racist violence are facets of a war in which a more ferocious and generalised condition of exploitation and oppression for all is taking shape. In this sense, the movement of migrant women and men continues to pose a challenge to the racist hierarchies intensified by war and militarism. It contains a call for peace that disrupts the logic of the fronts and highlights the urgent need for a transnational organisation to give force to the rejection of racism that, within the war, hinders political communication between precarious workers, women and migrants.

6 Climate conflicts

Fighting in a warlike environment

War is an unavoidable problem for all climate conflicts. This is not only because the current war, like all wars, produces immense ecological devastation, but also because militarised violence and the ideology that legitimises it are erasing the urgency of confronting the climate crisis worldwide. Within the THIRD WORLD WAR, political space for a green transition has all but disappeared. That transition—an attempt by states and capital to govern the climate crisis by establishing a new ecological regime of accumulation, and thus a new line of conflict between capital's pursuit of profit and workers' refusal to bear the costs—has been sidelined. The question we face is how to remain within a field of struggle that this war has radically reconfigured, so that class-based climate conflicts can be activated against both war and environmental devastation.

The war demonstrates that states and capital cannot address the climate crisis through the pious rhetoric of green capitalist accumulation. Yet the transition—now reframed as "industrial and clean"—remains a climate class issue. It is a climate issue because extreme weather events driven by profound planetary transformations, and by the policies that have accelerated them, continue to threaten the lives of billions of men, women, and LGBTQ+ people. While vast regions of the globe suffer floods, rising seas, and unprecedented heat waves, Europe and North America increasingly face the same impacts (Adil—Eckstein—Künzel—Schäfer 2025). It is a class issue because climate change disproportionately affects poor workers and because the governance of the climate crisis reorganises the exploitation of living labour. As ever more people identify as "climate activists," climate becomes an unavoidable field of struggle for any movement or organisational process. Only through a class-based ecological practice can we open space for social

opposition to war, capable of confronting capitalist climate policies and their destructive effects.

For this reason, ecological movements must now consider how the Third World War is reshaping the green transition and how they can organise so that living labour can voice its refusal to be further exploited in an increasingly polluted world. In today's TRANSNATIONAL disorder, contingent local alliances between climate activists and workers are insufficient. We must address the obstacles and divisions that the war has introduced within the climate movement (Ende Gelände 2024) and recognise the emerging lines of division, conflict, and class struggle now unfolding under the banner of the Third World War. Only by doing so can we grasp the transnational processes through which capital and states attempt to reassert command over labour and how living labour rejects that command. This could give us the collective power needed to give political weight to our claims for climate and social justice.

Critique of transition

Historically, the major transitions of capitalist production toward new terrains of accumulation have never entailed abandoning older energy sources. Instead, they have reorganised the balance among them while meeting an overall global increase in capital's energy demand (Fressoz 2024). The current capitalist transition—carried out in the name of solving the climate crisis by exploiting new resources—is no exception. The year 2022 began with Russia's invasion of Ukraine and ended with the EU announcing RePowerEU: a plan centred on abandoning Russian gas, reopening fossil extraction sites in Europe, and securing new commercial partners. The war thus immediately revealed a transnational political disorder that reshaped international relations and upended the green transition that had been a hallmark of the first von der Leyen Commission. War has not merely slowed or halted capitalism's move away from fossil fuels; it has fundamentally reordered the timing and form of climate policies. We are witnessing not a "war ecology" (Charbonnier 2022), but the wartime cancellation of ecology as an urgent political problem. This makes it impossible to

conceive climate conflicts outside of a horizon defined by class opposition to war.

The triumphant tones that, four years ago, announced the imminent shift away from polluting sources have evaporated. Since 2022, war has imposed its own urgency ahead of the climate: gun violence, inflation that steals wages, higher energy bills, militarism, nationalism, new regasification terminals, industrial investments, expanded logistical hubs, and competition for control of new raw materials now dominate climate discourse. At the same time, the global rise of the right has shown that climate denial is itself a central component of the class-climate problem of the Third World War. This denial abandons workers to the impacts of climate disaster, pushes growing numbers of people to migrate, and seeks to eliminate all spaces for contestation against a system that steals the future while tightening its control over labour and worsening conditions of social reproduction. War thus tightens its grip on the movements of living labour, while denialism becomes the ideological expression of this material crisis. As Trump withdraws from the Paris Agreement, the Chinese government highlights the strategic importance of meeting climate goals without sacrificing profits from gas and mining. The openly industrial framing of the transition is now legitimated as a way to wage the Third World War through competitiveness and the pursuit of dominant positions in "strategic" investment fields.

Even before the war, the green transition did not promise an end to pollution or exploitation. When such a promise was made, few believed it, while many workers directly felt the impact of the industrial, mining, and logistical restructurings cloaked in a green veneer. Today, war has eclipsed even those modest promises, replacing them with the brute realities of MILITARISM, nationalism, and competition. "Clean" technologies have become strategic sectors for attracting investment and overcoming competitive disadvantage in a world market dominated by China—a country that continues to invest in green transition, leads in batteries, electric mobility, and solar technologies, controls many critical raw materials, and now competes over

semiconductors. These resources are so crucial that rare earths themselves become bargaining chips in the prospect of a Trump-mediated peace in Ukraine.

Security is the ideological key to transforming the green transition and delegitimising any opposition to capitalist climate governance. It is meant to align the interests of millions of workers and MIGRANTS with those of states. Thus, in the Mediterranean, European energy and climate policies have been tied to border control, regulating the movement of those fleeing the climate crisis and other forms of dispossession. Immediately after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, energy security became a way to hide the fact that the costs of war—inflation and soaring utility bills—were being shifted onto wage earners, all in the name of rallying the population behind Europe's confrontation with Putin's despotism.

War not only shapes political and economic initiatives far beyond the battlefields but also enables anti-ecological measures to be presented as "clean" or "green" while using the transition to reorganise the exploitation of living labour. This context explains how the Greens in Germany could violently evict ecological activists in Lützerath in January 2023 to continue coal mining in the name of energy security, all while Tesla deepened in Berlin the anti-union and hyper-exploitative practices already tested in its US plants. In this hierarchy of priorities, the primary "security" to be safeguarded is that of production.

Similarly, behind Trump's fantasies of acquiring Greenland for reasons of "national security and freedom throughout the world," or controlling Ukraine's rare earths, lie vast stores of gas and minerals—resources essential for advancing the American transition without endangering national capital's profits while prosecuting economic war against Russian gas and China's technological acceleration. Distinguishing between "green" and "black" capitalism clarifies why both must be rejected (Interventionistische Linke 2024). Yet this distinction also risks reproducing the ecological movement's previous difficulty in confronting the contradictions generated by the transition itself. In Eastern European mines and American auto factories, workers have

struggled to assert their power against the transition's redefinition of production and reproduction. It is not enough to condemn right-wing climate denial. These groups are powerful precisely because they offer their own versions of "clean" or "green" policies—dictating when the transition should occur, on what terms, and who must pay for it—while climate movements have often remained confined to declarations of urgency, lacking sustained organisational connections with workers' struggles (Fava—Terra 2024).

The wave of farmers' strikes across Europe from 2023 to early 2024 made this dynamic unmistakably clear. When climate becomes the object of a wartime political pact, some actors can escape its mandates while others cannot. A proposal to cut fuel benefits for agricultural vehicles triggered mobilisation among small and medium farmers—mobilisation no government dared ignore—prompting the European Commission to quickly exempt the agricultural sector from decarbonisation requirements and pesticide restrictions. Meanwhile, the ideological support offered by right-wing forces merged with these protests, erasing the position of farm workers—often migrants—who are exploited daily in the fields and whose conditions no transition has ever sought to transform. As then-Vice President for EU climate policy Maroš Šefčovič made clear, the transition first and foremost requires reorganising the exploitation of millions of agricultural workers and shoring up European industrial production. This increasingly looks like a vast transnational clean factory that ultimately no longer needs the label "green." This is the terrain of a climate class conflict that the war imposes—one that forces us to radically imagine an anti-war ecology.

The transnational clean factory

Attempts to confront the climate crisis have again revealed the inadequacy of the STATE—not only because national borders cannot contain the territories, populations, and processes affected by the climate crisis, but also because states cannot restrain capital's transnational movement. The green transition was presented as a tool for governing capitalist accumulation, but the struggle to advance it

through planning has exposed various actors' resistance to being governed. It is no coincidence that while BlackRock still promoted the transition in July 2024—offering specialised investment pathways and steering firms toward sustainability—six months later it withdrew from the Net Zero Asset Managers alliance, abandoning its commitment to net-zero emissions by 2050.

There is no transition without states, but there is especially no transition without capital. Mario Draghi emphasised this when, presenting his plan for a competitive, industrial, and clean Union to the second von der Leyen Commission, he called for deregulation and for mobilising private capital "on an unprecedented scale" to finally realise the ambitions of the old Green Deal (Draghi 2024). The European Clean Industrial Deal presented in February 2025 still aims to strengthen EU authority over national policies by advancing an interconnected energy market. Yet it now confronts entrenched nationalisms within and beyond Europe at war. In the name of energy security, governments assert national priorities over European ones: Germany expands wind power while importing ever more Swedish energy, thereby raising prices there; Italy seals renewable-energy deals with Albania and the UAE while using the so-called Mattei Plan to deepen its access to North African resources and strengthen migration containment (Ogno 2024).

The structural and political interdependence demanded by the Commission is resisted by member states—and it diverges even further from capital's relentless search for low wages and weak protections. Relocations and production reconversions shift the social costs of wartime disorder onto workers. This is evident in the European automotive crisis, where electrification was supposed to unite climate policy with economic development. Now, even electrification is being slowed or paused by the EU to prevent certain states and business sectors from breaking ranks. Capital itself had already expressed impatience: while Stellantis dismantled the Mirafiori plant and halved its production capacity in Melfi, it doubled capacity in Morocco and threatened to move more production to Poland. These

relocations show how the transition becomes part of the machinery of war, enabling cheaper labour exploitation and lighter regulation. Likewise, the Volkswagen strike in Germany in December 2024 reflects tensions between capital's push to expand in a fragmented world market and states' desire to keep national capital anchored within their borders.

The Biden administration's Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) was driven by similar ambitions. Through subsidies and tax incentives for renewable energy and electric vehicles, Biden sought to hold together decarbonisation and accumulation, climate policy and economic development. Electrification of the automotive sector—both in the U.S. and Europe—was expected to anchor a market-based green transition. Yet this plan immediately ran into obstacles. The need to overhaul the electricity grid collided with older environmental protections limiting the installation of pylons in the American West. In April 2023, the *Economist* bluntly asserted that the energy revolution and economic growth could not be constrained by environmental protection—that "looting the planet" might be the way to save it. Then, a day after his second swearing-in, Trump cancelled environmental justice programmes and reopened offshore drilling in the name of energy and economic emergency: *drill*, *baby*, *drill*.

Although leveraged by Trump and embedded in denialist politics, the rejection of electrification has deeper roots than resentment toward 20th-century environmental laws. The electrification of car production has faced pressure from insufficient consumer demand, falling wages, and high production costs, expressed both through the social costs of the transition and by those who refuse to absorb them. By autumn 2023, manufacturers' attempts to relocate electric battery facilities to the impoverished, anti-union US South had been halted by the UAW's strike against the Big Three. This strike challenged both the transition and its reliance on deepened labour exploitation.

Still, investment in electric vehicles has not stopped. Even as Trump promises to dismantle IRA incentives so that Americans are not "forced" to buy electric cars, this does not signal the end of the transition but rather an industrial

reshaping of it—mirroring Europe. First, Trump cannot simply reverse processes already underway: major manufacturers have already invested IRA subsidies into electric production, opened battery plants in the South, and begun converting facilities. Second, while Trump pushes an authoritarian turn justified by a return to fossil fuels, green capital itself has abandoned democratic pretences in order to defend its interests. The tightening alignment between government and Silicon Valley—led by figures like Elon Musk and Peter Thiel—signals the possibility of a new compromise between fossil, green, and tech capital around a transition reshaped to integrate clean industry, digital infrastructure, and war.

Climate class conflict

The climate crisis will not wait for long-term capital redeployment plans. Those enduring the combined effects of pollution, exploitation, extreme heat, floods, and war cannot hope that clean industry will eventually resolve their situation. The challenge is to recognise that the transnational clean factory, with all its divisions and exploitative practices, is one of the factors currently impeding the organisation and mobilisation against war and its unsustainable demands for weapons, authority and environmental degradation. The most urgent task is to address the forces that are weakening the capacity of the millions of people caught in the suffocating mesh of the climate crisis and its governance to organise a collective refusal of these conditions. This requires articulating an ecological critique of war capable of identifying the divisions and fragmentations it produces, the effects generated by the industrial policies it legitimises, and the conditions for building a transnational movement. After years of global climate strikes, this movement has dispersed into too many separate currents (Climate Class Conflict 2024). Currently, class struggle within the industrial transition unfolds in fragments, while the ecological movement is stretched across multiple campaigns whose impact rarely extends beyond local territories. Furthermore, these campaigns encounter difficulties in maintaining long-term political connections and organisation. Even when

thousands gather to support a local cause that matters to the global fight for climate justice, results are rare, and mobilisation often dissolves immediately afterward. The challenge lies in breaking this cycle and building a force that does not dissipate after each action.

If the green transition has been relegated to the sidelines of the Third World War, we must consider the conditions that allow a climate class conflict to emerge today—one capable of opposing the industrial policies imposed by war and establishing lasting channels of communication with those who work and strike in the transnational clean factory. As states and capital redefine their power within the transnational disorder by fighting this war, our own politics and struggles must also become transnational. This means building an organisation that can open spaces of discussion and contest the hierarchies imposed by the war and the actors who claim to have the authority to govern the climate crisis. It also means establishing an organisation that continuously activates climate class conflicts, demonstrating the material possibility of ending the Third World War. For this reason, the strike—the practice and watchword that once energised the ecological movement—must again become central for confronting the reorganised systems of production and reproduction imposed by war.

7 Decolonial

Beyond campism

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a decolonial stance has emerged, framing war as the continuation of colonial violence by other means. More precisely, contemporary wars are seen as extensions of the original colonial violence through which the West inaugurated and imposed its "modernity" through extermination and global devastation. In this sense, it is unsurprising that, in the wake of the Israeli genocide in Gaza and the West Bank, this colonial genealogy of war has hardened, ultimately foreclosing debates within social movements. We speak of foreclosure not because the decolonial perspective lacks importance. On the contrary, it remains essential for stripping Europe and the West of their certainties, beginning with the illusion that the last seventy years constituted a world at peace. Palestinians—women, men, and LGBTQ+ people—among many others, have never experienced such a "peace." However, we speak of foreclosure because the lexicon of decoloniality now saturates the entire discourse on what we call the ongoing THIRD WORLD WAR. This reduces the war to a single episode in the long-standing conflict between the colonial West and a resistant, revolutionary Other. "Decolonial" thus becomes the marker of a campist discourse—one that distributes roles across opposing fronts while failing to recognise the deep internal differences that traverse each front and ultimately render their representation as predefined or homogeneous scripts impossible. In doing so, decolonial discourse struggles to recognise those TRANSNATIONAL movements of women and men, migrants and workers that challenge the notions of a homogeneous West and its supposed "Rest."

Decolonial ruptures

The problem, then, is how to dismantle this dualism, which

limits the possibility of a class struggle within and against the war, without abandoning the ruptures and openings that decoloniality has undeniably produced. For these ruptures were many. Decolonial thinking explicitly refers to the indigenous revolts of Mexico, Bolivia, and Ecuador in the early 1990s (Mignolo—Welsh 2018). Refusing to be confined to one "margin" among many, these movements rose up against both their own governments and the global command of living labour and its mobility at the very moment when the ideologues of the Washington Consensus were seeking to rebuild world order on the ruins of the Berlin Wall. Before it became a body of theory, then, decoloniality was a gesture: a political movement that resisted capture by fixed categories and disrupted the suffocating, repetitive logic structuring relations between the global "North" and "South."

This does not imply decoloniality was the only gesture opposing the rise of neoliberal globalisation. Across the world, living labour organised, resisted, and revolted in the name of another globalisation. Still, the decolonial gesture appears at the beginning of the "family album" of this transnational cycle of struggles, as an early figure acting within and against the emerging disorder of global capital and the institutions attempting to govern it. The Indigenous uprisings of Ecuador and Bolivia in 1990 and the Zapatista rebellion in Mexico in 1994 exposed the contradictions of postcolonial states that had become early laboratories of neoliberal restructuring in Latin America. These policies turned violently against Indigenous people, either by assimilating them into the "civilisation" of the market or by eliminating them through practices such as forced sterilisation, as in Fujimori's Peru, following the earlier Chilean model under Pinochet (De Ambroggi 2025).

Yet the decolonial gesture signified more than RESISTANCE. It marked the entry of the margin into the centre: an unexpected rupture that shook a world trapped in a nightmare presented as a dream, a world ruled by free trade, property, human rights, and Fukuyama's end of history. As Fanon reminds us, Indigenous subjectivation always unsettles those who continue to see the world through colonial eyes (Fanon 1986). The struggles of the 1990s opened a rupture in

the global order. They exposed the fragility of globalisation's promise of order and its reliance on violence. These were not the only ruptures that turned a supposedly smooth, homogeneous global space into the disorderly, ungovernable TRANSNATIONAL reality it is today. However, those ruptures emerging along old colonial fault lines were particularly significant, as they offered an early glimpse of the coming world war. Despite formal decolonisation, war had never truly disappeared. These ruptures made visible a future of hollowed STATE sovereignty, parliaments endowed with full powers but no effective borders, increasingly impoverished and differentiated forms of citizenship, and societies fractured by racial hierarchies, precarity, and misery. All pointed to an emerging transnational disorder and to the West's deepening crisis of omnipotence (Ricciardi 2025).

It was in this context that Aníbal Quijano formulated the concept of the coloniality of power. From Columbus onwards, he argued, the racialisation inherent in colonisation structured the logic of power and all its expressions. Within universities, this insight gave rise to decolonial thought, which later circulated as a form of social movements' discourse. More precisely, the order of discourse captured and regulated the political meaning of the decolonial gesture. The coloniality of power came to designate race as the decisive epistemic line separating slaves from waged workers, citizens from the rightless, landowners from the landless, scientific knowledge from "superstition," and the full "Man" from those relegated to the margins of humanity as Indigenous—or, at its limit, reduced to the subaltern category of "Woman" within a rigid gender binary rooted in the colonial act itself (Quijano 1992; Lugones 2008). Coloniality thus establishes an ontological architecture grounded in the dividing line of modernity, casting a shadow of non-humanity over those placed in the "wrong" race. Positioned outside history and modernity, the racialised and colonised subject is left with fragments of alleged barbarism, either discarded or included into capitalist production under conditions of absolute exploitation.

Within decolonial discourse, colonialism ceases to be a historical phase challenged by decolonisation or by the

unruly movements of MIGRANTS—movements that disrupt the presumed homogeneity of both former colonies and the First World. Instead, it becomes a primordial violence that endlessly reproduces itself. Instead of deepening the ruptures it has created, the gaze turns backwards in search of what Western epistemic violence sought to erase. In this way, decolonial discourse intercepts the antagonistic force of decolonial struggles, neutralising their subversive charge and their character as unforeseen historical openings towards the future. Rather than viewing the margins as a rejection of subalternity that connects differences in a shared horizon of emancipation (hooks 2015), decolonial discourse prioritises an identity that, although expandable beyond Latin America to Asia and Africa, is based on an internal homogeneity that often displaces differences relating to sex, gender, and class.

Within this essentialist frame, war is no longer considered a political issue in its own right. Instead, it is seen merely as an expression of colonialism: an epistemic and existential war waged by the West against lives, bodies, and knowledges deemed "other" to the modernity founded on Columbus's colonial conquest. Where coloniality rules, only the coloniser can wage war; the colonised are only entitled to RESISTANCE or flight. War is thus detached from the ungovernable movements of living labour that opened the decolonial rupture, along with many others worldwide. Instead, war is recorded as ontological violence aimed at erasing difference as such. To this violence, decolonial discourse opposes re-existence (Alban—Achinte 2008): the attempt to restore precolonial forms of life that, having survived centuries of domination, should now be freed from the West's grip.

This project takes the form of decolonial "delinking," the rejection of colonial knowledge and its structural violence. Yet this rejection presupposes the recoverability of a past—often mythical or imagined—assumed to be transparently available to (post)colonial subjects who are now called upon to revive it. Postcolonial critique—anticipated by Fanon's critique of négritude—had already warned against this assumption. After colonial violence, no authentic past remains fully recoverable. It is irretrievably lost. From this

insight emerged the radical question: "can the subaltern speak?" (Spivak 1988). Far from signalling defeat, this question called for attention to new and unforeseen voices, particularly those of colonised women able to break free from subalternity, from monolithic representations, and from patriarchal relations within so-called "native" societies. It also demanded the translation of struggles and concepts across experiences divided by colonial and postcolonial lines, accepting the risk of inhabiting a language without ownership. Within the decolonial discourse, however, the subaltern voice becomes singular. Only one re-existing voice is recognised as authentic, while all the others, even when sympathetic, are expected to line up behind it.

In this way, decoloniality slips back into the very postcolonial divide it appears to radicalise, silently restoring a binarism that postcolonial critique had sought to dismantle. Today this binarism blocks any peace politics that aims to break the fronts of war (STRIKE THE WAR). It is therefore unsurprising that, from the decolonial perspective, war now appears as a confrontation between de-Westernisation and a violent project of re-Westernisation (Mignolo 2023). Yet this raises a question: how does such framing advance the cause of peace—especially a peace that does not simply restore the existing relations of exploitation, patriarchy, and racism but confronts war and its logic to open new paths toward emancipation?

Decoloniality of war

In contrast to the decolonial rupture of the early 1990s, contemporary decolonial discourse no longer opens ruptures within the attempted global command over living labour that the Third World War seeks violently to reassert. Instead, it increasingly reinforces existing divisions produced by war. This is partly because the discourse has been selectively adapted to the needs of the current conflict, reinforcing the nationalist positions of the actors involved. It is also because the internal logic of decoloniality itself makes it difficult to articulate a political position adequate to the challenges posed by the Third World War.

In the months following the Russian invasion of

Ukraine, decolonial discourse entered public debate not only to affirm the pre-Russian roots of a Ukrainian nation but also to present Ukraine's response as a war of resistance and liberation from an oppressive empire—whether tsarist, Soviet, or Putinist. Some sectors of the social movements in Italy and Europe fully supported this interpretation, backing both the sending of arms to the Kyiv government and support for Ukrainian trade unions. In a symmetrical move, other sectors—having previously invested in Putin's alleged anti-imperialism and anti-Westernism, and later finding themselves aligned with Trump's most loyal supporters—celebrated the Russian invasion as a war of liberation of Ukrainian territories and peoples from the West's fascist proxies in Kyiv.

Both narratives—resistance against the Russian despot and liberation from Washington's puppets—belong to a decolonial discourse that has become entrenched. It has lost the subversive charge of the original decolonial gesture: it no longer opens ruptures or destabilises hierarchies imposed by the war. Instead, it consolidates and hardens them. Ukraine's colonial past and Russia's imperial past—Soviet or otherwise—are rearticulated in nationalist terms to stabilise two opposing fronts, making campism the only available criterion for taking a political position within the war. This illustrates the flexibility of the decolonial discourse, which can even accommodate ethno-nationalist distortions. From the creation of basutolands and bantustans—initially conceived as administrative entities in post-independence South Africa and later transformed into segregationist spaces under apartheid—to Modi's India, "decolonisation" and "self-determination" have become slogans for regimes built on exclusion, racism, patriarchy and conservatism (Dhingra 2023).

In the absence of mass mobilisations against the war in Ukraine, the risk of decolonial discourse becoming a state discourse was always present. This campist logic has also re-emerged within the movements for the liberation of Palestine and against the genocide carried out by Israel. This reveals the difficulties of decolonial thinking when confronted with the reality—and rejection—of war. The decolonial lexicon has

entered these movements in very different ways. In the United States and Europe, student encampments demanded boycotts and divestment from Israel, an end to the war and genocide in Gaza, and the construction of an inclusive movement for Palestinian liberation—one that successfully involved anti-Zionist Jewish groups (CUAD 2024). In France and England, mass demonstrations for Palestinian liberation brought university communities and civil society into the streets of Paris, Lyon, and Marseille, drawing together struggles against racism, colonialism, the far right, and the instrumentalisation of antisemitism by European states aligned with Israel (Tsedek! 2024).

Yet, the way movements have appropriated decolonial language in the context of the Third World War also reveals limitations. In some contexts, the celebration of October 7th as a decolonial uprising has overshadowed ongoing struggles against patriarchy and exploitation within colonised societies—even under bombardment. Nevertheless, this celebration did not prevent the participation of Jewish collectives in the immense mobilisations across the United States, Canada, France, Britain and elsewhere. In these contexts, movements managed to free themselves from some of the bottlenecks of the decolonial discourse, ensuring that the breach opened by 7 October did not re-close around the equations "Israeli equals settler" and "Jew equals Zionist"—equations through which the massacre of civilians and the rape of Israeli women have too often been justified. In Italy, by contrast, this failed to happen: October 7th was absorbed into a discourse structured around precisely these obscene equivalences (Montesano 2024).

In the Italian context, the movement for Palestine has often reproduced a logic of alignment between two fronts. Opposition to Israel, NATO and Western imperialism was treated as requiring support for Hamas as the only legitimate form of resistance and thus support for the entire Axis of Resistance. Critical discussion of these state actors or political regimes has been sharply restricted—if not explicitly censored—by the demand for positional purity and by the authority granted to the Palestinian speaker, whose voice could not (and often still cannot) be questioned. The

underlying assumption is clear: only those who are Palestinian by birth can speak, and only they can decide how the struggle should proceed—even for those far from Israeli bombs. A complete identification between blood and land becomes the basis of this authority, enabling some to define what it means "to be Palestinian" and to assert that Palestinian identity necessarily entails adherence to a specific political project such as that of Hamas—despite recent protests in Gaza challenging this claim. Others—the so-called allies—can only listen and support, lest they be accused of instrumentalisation. Here, decolonial discourse operates through the unconditional elevation of positionality. The critical gaze, once capable of exploring the ruptures of transnational disorder, has become a pulpit that proclaims a single, authentic and unquestionable voice. This voice is attributed to an imagined colonised subject belonging to a homogeneous people in opposition to an equally homogeneous colonialist West. By creating an epistemologically and ontologically separated "us" and "them," within the Third World War, decoloniality fails to unsettle the internally cohesive fronts that war logic imposes. In the name of an original wound that never heals, decoloniality reproduces these fronts by imagining decolonial revenge as epistemic re-existence: the affirmation of a colonised self against a colonising other. In sustaining two irreconcilable fronts, decolonial discourse fuses with war itself, reinforcing and intensifying it. By reducing the colonial matrix to the sole and fundamental principle of power relations, it freezes the divisions it posits—colonised versus coloniser—reproducing, in inverted form, the same Manichaeism that Fanon identified as central to colonial ideology.

This multiplicity of binary camps—characteristic of the Third World War—is precisely where the decolonial discourse finds fertile ground. It aligns naturally with the frontist logic structuring various clashes—not only between North and South but also between East and West—while obscuring political practices that attempt to disrupt identity-based dichotomies. As a result, Ukrainian soldiers fleeing forced conscription or Israelis refusing conscription must be erased

from view in order to preserve the supposed unity of each front and maintain the notion that origin—coloniser or colonised—is a fixed and unchanging attribute, endlessly available for political mobilisation. Likewise, Palestinian men and women are often imagined as motivated solely by a desire to return to an original time before the Nakba or the British mandate—an imagined egalitarian world free from colonial oppression and therefore from all violence. This narrative forgets both centuries of Ottoman domination and the historical divisions within Arab societies. The future is thus held hostage to this backwards-looking tension that erases differences and alternative forms of subjectivation that do not conform to monolithic identity narratives. Palestinians are rendered an undifferentiated mass, without class or gender distinctions, without internal frictions, united only by the collective desire to liberate the land—even though many Palestinians have insisted on a decolonisation process that is class-based and feminist as a precondition for rebirth after the war (Shababi 2023).

In this way, the decolonial imaginary becomes a campist imaginary—one that leaves no space for the political potential of real movements, such as migrant women and men, who daily disrupt homogeneities, fronts, and predetermined alignments.

Beyond decolonial binarism

The contrast between the absence of a mass movement against the war in Ukraine and the hundreds of initiatives—scattered yet often powerful—against the Israeli genocide in Gaza and in support of a free Palestine shows how difficult it is to articulate a comprehensive stance against the war, even when framed within decolonial discourse. In the decolonial dichotomy of "us" and "them," and in the attachment to an originary past that supposedly guarantees a future beyond coloniality and war, there is little room to grasp the struggles against exploitation, violence, and racism.

Some decolonial authors have attempted to overcome this fragmentation by proposing alliances between groups that usually remain separate—for instance, between the "barbarians" of the banlieues and the white underclass

(Bouteldja 2024). Others imagine alliances built on shared oppression, organised along the rigid geographies that produce the global North and South as sealed and opposing spaces. Yet while experiences of oppression recur across many contexts, they are not sufficient to create a political position against war. One of the persistent limits of decolonial discourse is its insistence that the only viable organisational form is an alliance rooted in the unity of individual and collective "decolonised subjects." From the centre of Europe, however, it becomes evident that oppression alone cannot provide a basis for unifying struggles beyond isolated uprisings. This is not because most of the Europeans, or "whites," would be excluded from "positional" alliances based on hierarchies of affiliation or origin. Rather, it is because we believe that, in the Third World War, it is necessary to identify and practise terrains of struggle beyond the shifting sands of homogeneous identities. This means overturning the divisions imposed by the logic of war and moving beyond alliances that reduce Palestine to a paradigm for interpreting global and transnational conflicts, or the condensation point of all struggles, anchoring a mythical present in a mythical past. We hold that taking a stand means imagining alliances not only *within* oppressions but also *against* them. It means recognising the need for a transnational politics centred on those subjects who embody the coexistence "of a 'North' in the 'South' and of the 'South' in the 'North'" (Balibar 2024) and who fight exploitation and violence. Only by starting from transnational movements—such as that of migrant women and men who seek not different pasts but futures—can a struggle against war and against the identities imposed by colonialism take shape.

This opens the possibility that anti-colonial struggles might include practices that lie outside the confines and "frontiers" of decolonial discourse. These are practices that turn the future into a battleground and mobilise social forces that are not defined in advance by identity, but are ready to fight for independence and something more. That "something more" animated, for example, the Algerian revolution, which is often invoked today by the Palestinian liberation movement through analogies that cannot be reduced simply to the

shared category of settler colonialism. This category is essential for understanding the material conditions of domination—the daily threat of bombing or drones, displacement, arbitrary detention, deportation, and the occupation that steals lifetimes and harasses even when absent or paused by a truce. Yet when decolonisation assumes that every Israeli is a settler, every Russian longs for Tsarist grandeur, every Palestinian upholds Sharia law, and every Ukrainian dreams of joining fascist brigades, then the boundaries of political actors become fixed within an unbreakable decolonial framework. The danger is that this logic crystallises the very blocs we aim to dismantle and forecloses the spaces of connection necessary for a transnational politics grounded in the subjective positions of those who reject the global command over living labour that war enforces. Decolonisation is not a metaphor, as has been rightly observed (Tuck—Yang 2012). Precisely for this reason, however, it cannot turn every man and woman into a metaphorical stand-in for a state that may not represent them—and that many actively reject.

The point is not to abandon the decolonial discourse altogether but to challenge its dichotomies, its essentialist identities, and its attachment to the past. These are the very elements that diminish the disruptive force of the actions and struggles unfolding within and against the Third World War—struggles capable of interrupting the violent command weighing on the lives of precarious workers, women, and migrants. Our decolonisation must be a rejection of Eurocentrism and an affirmation of a transnational politics of peace. But this necessary decolonisation—clear, radical, and orientated toward the future—can only be a decolonisation without borders (Mohanty 2003).

8 Resistance

To struggle across the fronts

In the THIRD WORLD WAR, "resistance" takes many different meanings. Where bombs fall and battles rage—in Palestine as in Ukraine—resistance means a forced struggle for daily survival, the effort to reproduce one's existence, to flee, or to desert in order to escape the carnage. At the same time, the term has been appropriated by an alliance of states, militias, and regimes—the so-called "Axis of Resistance"—whose political project reproduces the very nationalism, patriarchy, and exploitation that we should be fighting against. This project has led us to the war and continually regenerates it (Zoakei 2024). These are, of course, two materially different forms of resistance. And they differ again from the resistance of those fighting in Eastern Europe to defend or redefine a border, meaning for the STATE and the restoration of its territorial sovereignty. Here, resistance expresses not only the pursuit of rights but also the dream of restoring the imagined unity of a people and its (DECOLONIAL) identity. Meanwhile, far from the bombs, the language of resistance has been invoked by those attempting to oppose the Third World War, but who remain caught in the narrow logic of campism.

It is precisely this campism—and its acceptance as a "lesser evil"—that reveals the difficulty of mobilising the concept of resistance as part of a genuine process of politicisation. Invoking resistance makes it more difficult to articulate the struggles that actually exist within the framework of a TRANSNATIONAL politics of peace adequate to oppose a conflict that spans from the Middle East to the Red Sea, through Eastern Europe, and into Central Africa. There are two main reasons for this. First, resistance has a reactive dimension: it operates within a field of force defined by the counterparty. Second, borrowing the language political scientists use for populism (Mudde—Kaltwasser 2017),

resistance can be defined as an "ideology with a thin core." Its "incompleteness" means that its actual content depends on the broader ideological and programmatic frameworks that shape its specific practice. Put differently, "resistance" is not in itself a guarantee of a partisan politics striving for emancipation from exploitation and oppression. This is hardly new. A "right to resistance" has been present in political thought since the Middle Ages. It appears in dozens of contemporary constitutions, and its constitutional recognition has grown significantly in recent decades (Ginsburg–Lansberg–Rodriguez–Versteeg 2013). Yet this expansion of the discourse has certainly not produced greater global emancipation from exploitation.

Given this semantic confusion and the political problems it generates, we believe it is necessary to reflect on the meaning of resistance to construct a transnational politics within and against the Third World War. Those living under bombardments, struggling simply to survive, cannot be asked to undertake this reflection. But those who feel the effects of war and militarism only from a distance—who see the bombs but are not directly under them—must take on this task. What kind of resistance do we invoke when we speak of resistance? And how speaking of resistance today can help produce political practices capable of liberation—practices that confront exploitation and oppression rather than becoming absorbed by the logic of war?

Resistance within struggles

The reference to resistance within communist discourse did not acquire political relevance until the Second World War. From the late nineteenth century to the first half of the twentieth, the communist movement cared little for "resisting"; as it rather focused on "attacking." In a Europe haunted by the spectre of communism, resistance belonged to those defending the existing social order. For the workers' and communist movement, the problem of resistance arose only after the catastrophic defeat brought by the rise of Nazism and fascism. It is in this context that resistance became a vehicle of organisation and politicisation in the service of a broader project of collective emancipation. The

partisan Resistance—especially in Italy—was a militant experience capable of breaking the war's fronts by turning a patriotic war into a class struggle. It became a conflict between parties, not peoples, through which workers and women could transform their view of the present, break with the fascism that had shaped their lives and biographies, and embrace the partisan choice as a struggle to cease being what they had been (Cavalleri 2015). On a global scale, the resistance of millions of proletarians enabled the defeat of Nazi and fascist regimes and the end of a war that began with their mass domination (the Third World War). Here resistance became liberation, struggle against exploitation, and it is in this transformation that it gained its exemplary character.

Because of this exemplarity, the call for "resistance" has resounded throughout many mobilisations in Italy's recent and less recent past. It was echoed in June 1960, during the revolt against the MSI national convention that began in Genoa and spread across the peninsula. Behind the slogan "now and forever: resistance," which helped bring down the Tambroni government, lay not only a defence of the democratic constitutional order but also the emergence of a new working-class subject whose struggles would shape the following two decades. In the 1970s, too—responding to the state's and neo-fascist groups' strategy of massacres—the idea of resistance fused with a generation of proletarian movements that refused the factory as their destiny. Resistance meant preventing massacres and obstructing the state's emergency and repressive responses, which threatened to block the radical and dynamic processes of social transformation that many hoped for. In 1994, at the outset of the first Berlusconi government, a massive demonstration organised by the *Manifesto* group filled the streets of Milan. Hundreds of political organisations, trade unions, social centres, left-wing associations, collectives, and thousands of people marched in the rain chanting "O partigiano portali via," calling for resistance against the first government which was legitimising the institutional presence of MSI neo-fascists. This demonstration was crucial for what unfolded in the following years, culminating in and extending

beyond the days of Genoa in July 2001. Resisting in the counter-summits of Prague, Seattle, and Genoa meant advancing an alternative idea of globalisation.

The same was true for the anti-war movements that emerged after the Second World War, beginning with Vietnam (Chomsky 1967). The lexicon of resistance became intertwined with anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist struggles. In Italy, resistance to compulsory military service led to the adoption of Law 772 of 15 December 1972 on conscientious objection. Resisting the First and Second Gulf Wars meant attempting to halt the machinery of war production and reproduction—without aligning with Saddam Hussein's regime, nor with the Taliban or Al-Qaeda. In short, resistance expressed an autonomous standpoint, distinct from existing geopolitical alliances and exempt from specific national characteristics, but also different from traditional internationalism rooted in parties and national trade unions.

Across these examples (and others could be added), resistance shed its merely reactive character. It took root in struggles, in moments of organisation and political planning against exploitation and oppression. It became not only an act of opposition within a force-field shaped by others, but also a process aimed at transforming that field itself. If we want to turn resistance from an "opposition to a force" into an "oppositional force" (Niamanouch 2024), we must ask how to initiate a process capable of politicising subjects who are not already predetermined—subjects whose identity is not simply negated. We need, in other words, to develop an organisational process that poses the problem of transforming reality rather than reproducing what already exists. This requires overcoming the reactive nature of resistance and transforming the field of forces, which otherwise remains determined by our adversary—embodied, depending on the context, by a government, a state, a regime, or a capitalist platform.

These questions are unavoidable if we want to politically discuss the meaning of resistance today. Likewise, we believe it is essential to oppose the war logic of campism and bloc politics in all their forms, even when they appear under the banner of resistance. If the discourse of resistance

cannot answer the questions outlined above, it risks reinforcing divisions into camps that reproduce the logic of war and prevent people from autonomously building their own side outside the blocs imposed by geopolitical or identity-based oppositions. Across all fronts, we must take the side of those fighting against every attempt to reconstitute a social order built on racism, sexism, exploitation, and oppression—an order that crosses the borders of the warring states.

Resisting campism

If resistance becomes a moral fact, then resisting becomes right regardless of the assumptions and aims that guide resistant action. In this way, one ends up treating the subjects that make up current alignments as if they were internally homogeneous groups—without grasping the oppression and exploitation that run through them, together with the struggles that oppose them. In this way, one loses the ability to recognise as comrades those who oppose their state and refuse to go along with its deadly logic. The call for resistance then ends up establishing a hierarchy of oppressions. The Kurdish and Iranian women's claims to freedom—repressed even more harshly by the government in Tehran after the armed clash with Israel—are sacrificed on the altar of geopolitics because of the "resistant" role attributed to Iran in the Middle East against "Western imperialism" (TRANSNATIONAL) and because of the supposed "universal justice" of this resistance. The appeal to resistance would thus lead us to believe that the struggle against patriarchy, racism, and exploitation is viable only once full national sovereignty has been achieved.

This is the blunder of a resistance that turns into myth: it blocks the possibilities present in the current disorder instead of opening them up to changes that refuse to remain within the already given political forms. After all, history itself shows cases in which resistance, once transformed into state power, has repressed those who—despite having participated in that very resistance—sought to continue the struggle for emancipation and against exploitation, racism, and patriarchy. In independent and victorious Algeria after the

FLN's anti-colonial resistance, some of the first victims of Houari Boumédiène's 19 June 1965 coup d'état were the communists. Those who had been imprisoned, repressed, and tortured by the French army for their participation in the Algerian resistance then suffered the same fate at the hands of other resisters (Asseraf 2024). Resistance, in short, is never a monolith (Abu-Manneh 2024). Its invocation should never risk obscuring the class struggle in the logic of fronts. Instead, it should aim at constructing a partisan line-up for liberation—one that, under current conditions, can only take shape through rejecting war and struggling against it.

From Europe to the United States, the genocide carried out by the State of Israel against the Palestinian population has generated responses that were not mere forms of resistance. They unfolded in streets, workplaces, and universities, showing a widespread unwillingness to submit to the Western states' geopolitics of war. Yet the states and regimes that support the Palestinian population are neither temporary allies nor lasting friends. Our judgment on their confessional and patriarchal policies, and on the type of society they promote, cannot be suspended even for a moment. When these states and their supporters speak of resistance, they simply reaffirm the logic of an essential distinction between friend and foe—the same logic that fuels war and its abuses. The call for resistance becomes the vehicle through which this logic gains traction within social movements. Here, resistance's reactive character, already problematic, has come to signify a true renunciation: a refusal to construct and determine "our side," to initiate politicisation, and to forge connections across national, ethnic, and identity boundaries.

In other words, resistance has not grafted itself onto struggles, organisational efforts, or political projects against exploitation and oppression. Instead, it has obstructed such organising. It has remained fully within the force field defined by the other side and has ultimately fed MILITARISM. For many, resistance has meant identifying all those on the opposing front as enemies, regardless of their material conditions or the struggles they carry out. It has meant treating alliances with young Israeli draft-dodgers as impossible simply

because they belong to the "oppressor" front—considering their anti-war stance not as a potential strengthening of anti-war ranks but as a form of unacceptable normalisation that weakens the "real" resistance.

The emergence of a discourse of resistance within the Third World War therefore does not seem to have enhanced processes of politicisation against the war or against its underlying logic. Nor it has aligned with struggles against exploitation, patriarchy, and racism, which are instead expanding. The call for resistance has been accompanied by identity hardening, by the prioritisation of national liberation and the self-determination of "a people," and by essentialist visions of decolonisation that project a hypothetical "return to the past," in which the ultimate goal appears to be the reassertion of sovereign or ancestral control over a territory (DECOLONIAL).

This "nationalist-statist" mentality, as the Kurdish freedom movement rightly argues (Bayik 2024), worsens problems rather than resolving them. The call for resistance is thus utterly inadequate in relation to the urgent need to fight the Third World War on a transnational level. It fails to understand the global connections that constitute this war, treating each of its segments as an exceptional time and space rather than as part of a global continuum. And it misses the fact that this war contains yet another episode of the long crisis of sovereignty. For the movements of living labour, we repeat, within this war, there is no exit that can be inscribed within the state tradition.

Resistance/transformation

The call for resistance has meant the reproduction of a logic of war. Should we then abandon resistance and its language altogether? We think not—so long as we manage to reactivate the connection between resistance and transformation, thereby transcending the nexus between resistance and reaction or reassertion. For example, Russian feminists of the Feminist Anti-War Resistance, founded in February 2022 to oppose the Russian invasion of Ukraine, explicitly speak of resistance. A form of resistance is also practised by the thousands of Ukrainian and Russian defectors who flee the

frontlines, determined not to reproduce the logic of war through their participation (Sceresini 2024). With their actions, these deserters materially jam the war machine, refusing to align themselves with the borders defined by their nationality and transforming both themselves and the spaces they go through. Also the activists in the popular committees of the West Bank use the language of resilience as they oppose Israeli colonial occupation and the construction of new settlements. Among others, Youth Against Settlements in Hebron challenges occupation violence through forms of "civil resistance," while the grassroots political organisation Youth of Sumud (Youth of Resilience) counters the attacks of settlers and the Israeli army aimed at destroying homes and villages. The Kurdish liberation movement also speaks of resistance, but it does so within a broader project of emancipation in which resistance is a means rather than an end. This is why Kurdish women have been able to transform resistance, here and now, into a struggle against patriarchy and toward building a society free from gender oppression (Ferrari 2025).

In these calls to resistance, the force field is transformed. It is no coincidence that the communities of the YPJ, who also take up arms, insist that they do not see themselves simply as self-defence forces but as part of a broader revolution (Tank 2017), thereby refusing the logic of MILITARISM. In many cases, resistance is indeed a necessity arising from concrete and material realities rather than from ideological choices (Omar 2024). Yet multiple ideological choices run through it, as they run through every society. This is why we insist that resistance, in and of itself, does not guarantee the articulation of a project of collective liberation.

Beyond resistance—and within the various ideological tendencies that traverse it—a partisan and transnational politics can be built. Such politics can connect the real movements of precarious workers, MIGRANTS, women, and LGBTQ+ people who reject the inevitability of war and its logic every day and everywhere. The question "which side are you on?" cannot be asked within a framework shaped by passports and identity essentialism. Its answer must emerge from the ability to co-construct a transnational partition

between the oppressed and the oppressors, capable of overcoming walls, borders, blockades, and fronts. Only in this way is it possible to identify exploitation, racism, and patriarchy at every latitude—and to struggle against them at every latitude.

9 Strike the War

For a transnational politics of peace

The THIRD WORLD WAR fundamentally redefines both pacifism and peace, compelling us to question what it means to reject war today. The political problem posed by the Third World War does not end with peace agreements or even with precarious truces. In the context of the Third World War, any diplomatic solution is unstable and temporary, as war fronts can open or reopen at any time. It is therefore urgent to halt the ongoing massacres on all fronts—fully aware that no state and no international agreement can currently guarantee even the most essential truce, and that no peace deserves that name if it rests on the daily violence of patriarchy, racism, and exploitation. Opposing this social violence is necessary to construct the field of visibility within which the end of the Third World War could signify not an "armed peace" (Luxemburg 1911) but the affirmation of the power of living labour—a horizon we call a TRANSNATIONAL politics of peace (Permanent Assembly against the War 2022).

Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the profound difficulties faced by global movements in constructing this field of visibility—across and beyond war fronts—have been evident. Some words have been taken hostage by warmongering polemics, in which pronouncing one term rather than another was interpreted as support for Putin over the US or NATO, or for Israel over Hamas or Hezbollah. Even the word "war" became contentious, as the specificity of each situation appeared to demand its own label rather than conceptual tools capable of building the conditions for a shared struggle beyond alignments and their obligatory enemies. Rather than conceiving war as a condition affecting living labour on a global scale, some claimed their own war to be the only true one, the cause or paradigm of all others, and thereby their own enemies as the only true enemies. The

genealogy of war was transformed into a hierarchy of wars. As a result, demands for peace have been absorbed into the grammar of geopolitics and international law—peoples, borders, diplomacy, identity—producing, more often than not, a cumbersome silence and the absence of any broad or sustained anti-war movement.

Whatever form such a movement may eventually take, we believe it must begin from those women and men—migrants, workers, and precarious workers—who reject war in their daily lives. They do so not only by taking to the streets against genocide in Gaza, for a ceasefire in Ukraine, or in opposition to specific wars, but by contesting the everyday violent consequences of war: oppression, exploitation, and the compulsion to accept any sacrifice in the name of war itself. These expressions of refusal include, though do not end with, those who desert or flee conscription—as is happening *en masse* in Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, in Russia. Even Israel, the most militarised state in the world, struggles to convince its citizens to continue dying while participating in the slaughter of Palestinians; as the voices of draft refusers continue to resonate, it has begun recruiting MIGRANTS from several African countries in exchange for residence permits. War managers appear increasingly aware that they must devise new incentives for enlistment—from the promise of citizenship to the prospect of self-exploitation that military service offers.

Yet making desertion the model for a politics of peace would be reductive. War today extends far beyond the compulsion to fight or the war-driven market economy that organises it. The Third World War confronts us with a mutation whose effects we experience daily: an expanded use of organised violence to impose a command without mediation, reaching well beyond the battlefield. This element does not only kill and prepare machines of death, but fragments, divides, exploits without compensation, and oppresses without opposition. The Third World War does not signify an anticipated escalation in which more countries are drawn into direct military confrontation—nor does it call for a generic effort to prevent the war from spreading. Likewise, a politics of peace cannot be limited to constructing a system

of deterrence that merely postpones war while keeping it perpetually possible. We are dealing with a mutation in which war does not always present itself in uniform.

Afterall, the current conjuncture marked by war does not establish a new regime to which we must resign ourselves to live and struggle in. Rather, it is marked by extreme instability—impossible to be permanently normalised—in which we will need to deal with chains of unexpected events, alternating moments of peace and war, rather than decisive crises or field battles. It is in relation to this instability that we must organise possibilities for connection and construct shared political lexicons. The outcome of the Third World War is not predetermined. We are not simply witnessing the crisis that marks a transition to a new world order or the birth pangs of a new regime of accumulation. Nor are we dealing with the temporary intensification of command typical of systemic crises that precede the construction of renewed consensus or hegemony (Arrighi–Silver 1999). No new interweaving of repression, restructuring, and reform is waiting to emerge from the ashes of the Washington Consensus.

The outcome of the Third World War remains open. It will depend on how the conflict between living labour and transnational capital—the real stake of this war—is articulated in the struggles to come.

The conundrum of peace

Our peace politics today is a conundrum because it confronts both the reactionary and securitarian appropriation of the demand for peace and the instrumentalisation of that same demand across the different war fronts. The politics of peace is, first of all, a puzzle because right-wing parties in power now brandish "peace" as a weapon of war. At the time of writing, negotiations for a truce in Ukraine are underway. In both Ukraine and Gaza, Trumpian peace plans resemble paradoxical "Versailles of capital," recalling the untenable conditions imposed on Germany after the First World War. Yet this time the noose is tightened not around a defeated empire but around anyone who obstructs the accumulation processes of US corporations. Whatever form peace may take

in Ukraine, it will not end the Third World War, because it will precisely preserve the conditions that produced the war.

Domestically, the *Pax Trumpiana* is an imposed pacification expressed in openly authoritarian forms: against anti-war movements at home; against migrant and women's movements; against the antiracism of movements like Black Lives Matter; against workers' insubordinations that refuse to settle for crumbs; and against pro-Palestinian and ecological movements whose demands for justice remain intolerably radical for the ruling order. In Europe as well, parties which have made peace a central watchword of their programmes, such as the German AfD, have simultaneously supported rearmament and the reintroduction of compulsory military conscription. Meanwhile, Ukrainians men and women—exploited daily in German factories, homes and warehouses—are expected to be left to die without interference (Kleiss–Weber 2024). National peace requires erecting a wall in defence of the German people and capital, thereby feeding the nationalism that sustains the logic of war.

Moreover, authoritarianism is not the prerogative of the neo-fascist, sovereigntist, or reactionary right-wing forces which have seized upon war as an opportunity for expansion and affirmation. Authoritarianism is now integral to democracy itself, becoming the cipher of its neoliberal and belligerent form. "We are not at war, but we are not at peace either": with these words, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte urged European citizens to pressure their governments to redirect pension, health, and education funds into military investment and technology. Having reached the endpoint of a long cycle of welfare dismantling, the STATE is now tasked with organising and legitimising innovations and financial bets designed to render Europe capable of countering a presumedly inevitable Russian invasion. The Rearm Europe–Readiness 2030 plan sets the industrial priorities of the future. Within this framework of armed peace, every sacrifice must be accepted; and it seems that no alternative is permitted between an openly fought war and an armed peace.

No justice, no peace?

Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, peace itself has

been conscripted into the war fronts through a campist logic that has paralysed movements. Anyone who spoke of peace was accused either of supporting Russian aggression and demanding Ukrainian surrender, or of justifying Israeli occupation and requiring Palestinian surrender. Through a distorted reinterpretation of the Afro-American movement's slogan "no justice, no peace," a notion of *just peace*, equated with military victory, emerged. Peace became framed as the privilege of those not living under bombardment, while war appeared as the only path to end injustice—so that, to obtain liberation, it would be necessary to win the war first. Our transnational politics of peace explicitly rejects this obligated road. It aims to open practices of struggle against exploitation and oppression that do not require war. The transnational politics of peace is therefore the opposite of social peace. In the words of a Black Lives Matter activist, who repeated the slogan across Baltimore, Ferguson, and beyond: "Some read the slogan 'no justice, no peace' as a threat. For us, it is a simple statement of fact: there will never be peace—not in our hearts, not in the streets—without justice for those who have paid the highest price for police brutality" (Mckesson 2022).

War demands social peace. In its name, struggles against racism, patriarchy, and exploitation must be silenced. Identifying with states or regimes at war does not shatter the social peace produced by everyday violence—it reproduces it. Reversing an expression from German labour law that has been mobilised to threaten and fire anyone speaking against genocide since 7 October 2023, we must break the "obligation of peace" that war paradoxically reinforces (Streeck 2024).

The Pro-Palestine movement has had the undeniable merit of shaking the world out of its addiction to war. Despite repression, it has transnationally amplified the rejection of the genocide in Gaza. At times it has succeeded in breaking fronts, joining with all those who oppose the war regardless of their national or ethnic identity. At other moments, however, it has succumbed to campism, overwriting social relations through a rigid friend–foe logic. Also due to the attempts to pacify the Palestinian and the broader Middle East question which have consolidated and legitimised Israeli expansion into Palestinian territories over decades, peace

seems to have become in this case nothing more than a "colonial peace", anchored in the genocidal project of the Israeli government (Said 1996). As Netanyahu declared: "We do not just want to win the war, we want to win the peace"—a formulation that signals a final solution to eliminate the Palestinian problem by eliminating Palestinians. The Trumpian Versailles of capital has shown that it is no longer satisfied with turning Palestinians into a population of refugees, adding the promise of investment and profit as a way to legitimise this project.

The genocidal violence of Israeli occupation teaches us that a transnational politics of peace cannot simply aim at restoring a pre-war status quo. Instead, it must open a space of refusal within and against war. This cannot operate in the idiom of classical pacifism—as a principled refusal of violence, or as a neutrality that sits outside the conflict—because in the Third World War, neutrality simply is no longer possible. To place the refusal of war at the centre means to consider war as the defining reality of our time: a reality that profoundly reshapes conditions of class struggle and that must be actively contested against its obligatory fronts. It means refusing the manufactured absence of alternatives and the compulsions through which the past of oppression functions as a multiplier of present violence.

Strike against the war's work

During the wave of strikes and demonstrations against the French pension reform—one year after the start of the war in Ukraine—the French trade union Solidaires declared: "Macron wages war against us" (Solidaires 2023). While raising the retirement age was framed as necessary to avoid widening the public deficit, the same government planned to raise military spending from 2% to 3.5% of GDP. According to Macron's programme, defence spending should more than double by 2030 compared to 2017, justified by the need to "be realistic" and prepare for increasingly brutal and frequent wars. Workers in France were thus told they must learn sacrifice and obedience in the face of force majeure, in order to build a precarious European front in a proud battle against the eastern despot. The strikes and demonstrations that

swept France in that moment, even when they did not explicitly call for peace, expressed a refusal to bow our heads and become soldiers of labour under a commander-in-chief. The question is how to connect this refusal transnationally so that it does not end with blocking a single reform, but opens organisational processes capable of actively rejecting war and its long-term effects.

Unprecedented strike waves preceded both World Wars, and the years immediately before and after their end were marked by dramatic increases in global labour insubordination (Silver 2004). World wars can be read not only as responses to the need to impose command over living labour on a global scale, but also as moments in which unexpected conditions arise for the assertion of workers' collective power—the only concrete force for peace we can hope to sustain. In the first two World Wars, a struggle unfolded beyond the battlefield, one that challenged the authority of states and empires. That struggle must be reopened also in the Third World War, but the only way to do so requires recognising that the transformations of recent decades make it impossible simply to repeat lessons of the past.

Already in the wake of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the "work of war" changed so radically that the historic link between war and insubordination was fundamentally redefined. Automation of war, outsourcing to private contractors, and the recruitment of non-US soldiers were all part of a deliberate military and political strategy developed after Vietnam to ensure that future wars would not produce intolerable side-effects—such as insubordination that linked anti-war mobilisation with struggles against racism, exploitation, and authoritarianism. Today, MILITARISM takes again newer forms because the bond between nationality, citizenship, and work has been decisively broken. Thus, conscription is no longer framed as patriotic sacrifice but as a means of individual self-valorisation. Marketed through the language of opportunity, military service now promises recognition, residency rights and permits, and higher wages. And there is no longer a single imperial enemy against whom a mass global movement can wage a crucial battle; even the

immense mobilisation against the Iraq War offers no replicable model (Riley–Mohanty–Pratt 2008). The possibility of peace today must be opened within every act of insubordination of living labour, by turning dispersed and isolated refusals into steps toward building a transnational collective force. How to do this is the political problem before us. Recognising this does not mean ignoring the war of bombs and blood, of ethnic cleansing and genocide, of destroyed schools and hospitals, of shattered lives and futures buried under ruins. It is clear that this war is not the same war we fight here, under the blows of exploitation, oppression, and racism. Yet the problem of peace is one and we will not solve it until we can collectively rise against the multiple faces of the Third World War in which we live.

Refusal of war and transnational organisation

Against the imperative of war, it is not enough to shout "not war but class war" and simply shift the terrain on which our conflicts are given. This position has the merit of refusing to treat war as an opportunity for class struggle—unlike those who argue that one must first win the war and only then fight exploitation and oppression (Sotsialnyi Rukh 2024). Yet we do not believe that today's peace politics can reproduce the historical conditions that once made it possible to "turn imperialist war into civil war" (Lenin 1915). Nor is it useful to treat war as the eternal and mechanical consequence of capitalism, reducing its causes to functional explanations of who materially profits from it (Thompson 1980). War remains, to be sure, the ultimate expression of the proletariat's inability to impose itself on the power relations in which it is entangled. But class struggle today cannot be conceived as a confrontation between compact fronts. It needs to take into account fragmented subjects and the diverse and heterogeneous transnational movements that have dismantled the organisational assumptions and the homogeneous class conception of historical internationalism. The challenge is to build organisational processes that give space, voice, and continuity to the movement of living labour across its differences.

Our rejection of the Third World War can only be

organised transnationally. Developing a politics of peace shows that the TRANSNATIONAL is not reducible to alliances between national structures or representational apparatuses. It is a refusal on a full scale: it does not add to local practices but identifies and amplifies their politically transnational significance. If the Third World War appears to demand the ordering of national fronts and a return to organisational forms shaped by national frameworks, it does so precisely to secure the transnational valorisation of capital while blocking the one of living labour—beginning with freedom of movement. The revival of national politics occurs because nations are expected to guarantee capital in its transnational operations. Fighting capital therefore requires confronting it at the scale on which it organises its domination. The Third World War is the first great war fought on a transnational terrain, and the refusal of that war must itself be transnational.

A demand for peace runs through our struggles, even though this diffuse rejection of war rarely takes an organised form. Contesting the fronts cannot be done from a supposedly neutral position that pretends to stand beyond and above the fronts of war. Such neutrality ends up defending a hierarchy within an already diversified price list of war's costs. No one is outside the war anymore (though not everyone experiences it in the same way) and it is illusory to imagine returning to a situation in which, as Europeans, we could consider ourselves "at peace" while war rages elsewhere in the world. European rearmament exposes the nature of the armed peace which is being prepared. The question, then, is not whether to choose sides but how to do so knowing that our side corresponds to no existing war front. Within the war, we must actively break these fronts by demonstrating that possibilities for struggle exist beyond those silenced by a war framed as unavoidable. Today, we need to make peace a partisan politics and the refusal of war a moment for building connections across all who suffer under and oppose war: the ones waged to extend labour compulsion, patriarchal authoritarianism, and racism. The transnational dimension is the only one in which our differences can become, against the stalemate of campism,

the basis of an organisational project that openly seeks to construct *our* side within and against the war. This means making our politics of peace the practical guide for preparing the conditions of a transnational social strike against the war and its world.

CAPITALIST OASES AND THE PEDAGOGY OF WAR

Giorgio Grappi



Image: Migrant labourers in a construction site in Doha – Amnesty International 2021

Capitalist oases and the pedagogy of war

Notes on Gaza beyond indignation[2]

Giorgio Grappi

The web of value

The Financial Times recently reported that the Tony Blair Foundation had been involved in a series of email exchanges, subsequently picked up by media outlets worldwide, discussing details of the so-called Gaza Riviera project. The idea of transforming the Gaza Strip into a tourist, commercial, and manufacturing hub has entered public debate, partly thanks to Trump's sharing of an AI-generated satirical video, created by two video makers during a coffee break to test a new model—which nonetheless contributed to the project's global visibility (BBC 2025). In Israel, however, the Gaza 2035 project has been under discussion for some time. The *Times* provides detailed accounts of the initiative, including the adoption of 'development' schemes drawn up by the Boston Consulting Group. Members of this consulting firm were involved not only in shaping the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation's military food distribution plan, but also in discussing tools for the 'transfer' of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians (Boston Consulting Group 2025).

As grotesque as such a scenario may be in the face of the ongoing genocide, the Gaza Riviera project must be taken seriously for what it represents and for the context in which it emerges. In particular, it is consistent with economic development models of recent decades, particularly those linked to the planning of New Town. Both the conceptual

[2] This text was first published in Italian on connessioniprecarie.org on 21 July 2025.

framework and the aesthetic language of these models are clearly in the images published by the *Financial Times*. More broadly, the vision of turning Gaza into an economic El Dorado fits a wider strategy that can be described as a "corridor policy", a logic already at work in other regions of the world. The Riviera would, in fact, be located within the area of influence of the IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe) Corridor (Gili 2024). This corridor is designed to reshape value chains between Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Europe in a period of heightened competition, driven in part by Chinese infrastructure and digital capitalism and by the the proliferation of large-scale initiatives that form a moving web in which economic planning and geopolitical calculation intersect. The corollary of this spatial reimagination of the region are the Abraham Accords between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, as these agreements marked the starting point for what was presented as the normalisation of relations and the creation of the new economic area.

Neither the Abraham Accords nor the IMEC project emerged from the imagination of some obscure bureaucrat. On the contrary, they played a prominent role at the G20 summit held in India in September 2023. On the sidelines of that summit, the United States, the EU (notably Germany, France, and Italy), the United Kingdom, India, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates signed a memorandum of understanding, celebrated as one of the summit's main achievements.

For IMEC and the Gaza Riviera to become concrete projects, they must confront several obstacles: the presence of more than two million Palestinians living in the Strip, the remnants of Hamas, and diverging interests among the actors involved (Liebermann—Karni 2025). Even so, these elements are sufficient to illustrate that the 7 October attack and the subsequent devastating war in Gaza cannot be viewed as merely another chapter in a decades-long conflict. Rather, they must be understood as the manifestation of that conflict within new dynamics that reshape its meaning and its stakes. What is unfolding today in the Strip and the West Bank—where 7 October marked a sharp acceleration in the systematic dismantling of Palestinian territories—is

undeniably rooted in a long history that has been frequently recalled in recent months. Yet it is equally crucial to recognise the specificity of the present moment and to situate it within the broader framework of transnational disorder and the reorganization of capital that characterises our time. There is no need here to dwell on the Palestinian military action that triggered this new phase, except to underline that unhesitatingly condemning Israeli conduct does not negate the need for a continued discussion for anyone seeking to contribute to a liberation movement capable of ending the suffering that war inflicts on living labour. The more pressing question is how the massacre in Gaza exceeds its conventional frames.

A revealing indication of this was provided by the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu himself. At the UN Security Council in September 2024, he presented two opposing maps: one depicting the regional "curse" led by Iran and its allies, and the other depicting the "blessing" which simplistically mirrored the IMEC plan (Berman 2024). The absence of Palestine from both maps caused a stir, yet the two also made explicit what had previously remained implicit: the implementation of this vision as a driver for win-win economic growth presupposes a profound political and territorial reorganisation of the region. Seen in this light, the events of 7 October appear as a decisive turning point for this perspective. Just days after the triumphant announcement of IMEC, the war in Gaza erupted, simultaneously slowing down and rendering more concrete the project of redefining the value networks between Europe and Southeast Asia.

Outside exceptionalism

Of course, linking the genocide in Gaza to regional projects of 'development' also serves the Israeli government's propaganda and instrumental objectives. This does not, however, relativise what we are witnessing in Gaza. The genocide must be stopped, and the scale of the crimes committed by the IDF, together with its military and financial supporters, is unequivocal. The war's immediate outcome is the territorial expansion of Israel at the expense of Palestinian lands and lives. Yet without situating this violence

within a broader context, it is difficult to understand the remarkably mild reactions that have accompanied an ongoing massacre conducted with blatant disregard for international conventions.

It is therefore important to clarify that referring to projects such as IMEC does not imply the existence of a fully coherent or unified plan. Rather, it points to an effective tendency: a set of imaginaries and perspectives that mobilise interests, produce relationships, and orient actions, generating partial convergences among fractions of capital and political-institutional actors. The constellation of these interests is broad, heterogeneous, and closely tied to shifting political conditions. Two concrete examples illustrate this dynamic. The first is the port of Haifa, now owned by the Indian Adani Group and widely regarded as an outpost of India's new geo-economic projection. During the so-called "12-day war", Iranian missiles that fell near the port area triggered significant concern, precisely because of its strategic value. The second example is closer to home: the port of Trieste, whose strategic role within the IMEC framework was relaunched just weeks ago by the Friuli Venezia Giulia Region together with the Italian Ministry of Economy.

This raises a broader question. Why, at a moment when conflicts appear to be sweeping away the very idea of globalisation—exemplified most clearly by Trump's tariff policies—does the notion of a spatial organisation of the world market persist and re-emerge in this form? My hypothesis is that, within the disorder that now characterises international relations, war functions not only as an obstacle to the future scenarios outlined in master plans and memoranda. It is also one of the factors that actively shapes their development, both spatially and in terms of the processes they set in motion. Competition around projects for the reorganisation of production, technology, and geo-economics thus generates a field of tension. This field never leads to the complete realisation of such projects, yet it expresses the intertwining of capital's savage dimension with its constant need for territorial anchoring, alongside the territorial policies of states and their global projections. The

issue, then, is not one of replacing geopolitics with geoeconomics, but of pushing analysis beyond this false alternative. These projects should not be read as previews of future orders, as their promoters claim, but rather through the concrete effects they produce during their implementation.

This dimension becomes even more significant in the current context of war, which opens new zones of exploitation liberated from the constraints of social mediation. It is in this sense that Francesca Albanese's recent report can be read, where she speaks of an "economy of genocide". The report highlights not only the web of interests that sustain—and have long sustained—Israel's expansionist policies and the war, but also the contours of a broader phase characterised by the intertwining of technological development and production, politics of social control and innovation, the reorganisation of political spaces, and new processes of valorisation. In this case, rigid separations between sectors and specialisations, as well as the distinction between civilian and military spheres, lose their meaning. A synthesis of this reality can be found in a propaganda video produced by the Technion Israel Institute of Technology. In just over a minute, the video celebrates the military action against Iran by collapsing universities, weapons systems, medical research, and a comprehensive notion of security into a single narrative—one that resonates far beyond the borders of the Israeli state (American Technion Society 2025).

Interpreting these dynamics through the lens of a supposed Israeli or Palestinian exceptionalism does little to clarify the trends at work. On the contrary, it obscures the evident continuity within which they unfold. Regardless of the claims of messianic Jewish extremists, as well as those who advocate the destruction of Israel in the name of Islam, Palestine has never existed outside of historical time, nor has the so-called interreligious conflict stood apart from the history of capital. If anything, it is one of the places where the transformations of the global market and its successive reorganisations have been felt most acutely. Just as without the collapse of the Ottoman and British empires, the First and Second World Wars, the Holocaust, the rise of the fossil-fuel

economy, and the Khomeini revolution, it would be impossible to make sense of the present situation, what we are witnessing today cannot be understood without setting it in the crisis of the international order that structured the era of globalisation, the sweeping processes of digitalisation reshaping society, and the war that has been ongoing since Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

The latter has made one thing clear: in a context marked by the crisis of political and economic mediation, war itself becomes the mechanism through which balances are established—through its material impact on the ground, the interdependencies it generates, and its internal contradictions. In this sense, war is simultaneously productive and devastating, opening new possibilities within a world increasingly dominated by capital relations. Seen from this perspective, the scale of the genocide in Gaza and the de facto complicity surrounding it acquire a different meaning. This complicity extends well beyond Israel's most obvious allies and implicates a far wider range of actors. The convergence of these processes, together with the messianic visions of the Israeli right and the absence of any stable regional equilibrium, has contributed to turning Gaza into a global ground zero of the Third World War.

The dirty work of capital

In its development across different theatres and contexts, war has increasingly revealed that, behind geopolitical conflict, a deeper redefinition is underway: one that concerns the global structures of capital and their relationship to the organisation of space and time, and of the forms of coercion and command exercised over living labour. If we fail to question this redefinition—which also calls into question today's multipolar tendencies and the tension, already noted, between the accumulative drives of capital and the territorial policies of a battered yet heavily armed sovereignty—we risk being trapped in a politics of indignation, unable to halt war or interrupt its reproduction. For this reason, it is necessary to distance ourselves from the laboratories of a daily pedagogy of cruelty, in order to attempt to shape a political horizon that does not allow us to take refuge in the

certainties of the past.

A few days ago, Chancellor Merz—already destined to be remembered as the figure who rearmed Germany—provoked widespread reaction by commenting on the "12-day war," during which Israel launched a massive attack on Iran and, in turn, received blows that significantly undermined its presumed invulnerability. Merz stated that Israel was doing "the dirty work for us" in relation to Iran (ANSA 2025). The reference was to Iran's nuclear programme, whose destruction Netanyahu and Trump have used to justify their aggression, rapidly aligning allies whether they were convinced or not. The expression "someone has to do the dirty work" provoked indignation. Yet it is worth interrogating its less obvious meaning: who is included in this "us," and what kind of dirty work is actually being done?

It is useful to recall that violence as a form of economic power is not a colonial or imperialist deviation, but it has characterised the history of capital from its origins, accompanying its conquest of new territories and social spaces. In very general terms, the continuous transformation of the forms of real subsumption of labour under capital has always required force to become effective. The question, then, is how economic power, violence, and capitalist development are articulated today, in the context of the Third World War. When Netanyahu claims to pursue peace through force—arguing that, once force has been applied, the peace of business can be established—his statements, like those of Merz, are not accidental. Their bluntness serves as a reminder that force is an integral component of economic practices.

It is therefore necessary to reiterate that the relatively long period of 'peace' which enabled the formation of globalisation circuits, global circulation, and supply chains—an era that liberal observers often claim has only now come to an end—was itself marked by violence. This violence took the form of containment, expulsions and transfers, environmental devastation, the creation of new enclaves, dispossession, and the exploitation of migrant labour through institutional racism, zones, securitisation, and armed conflicts over the hoarding of resources or the control of sites

deemed strategic. Forms of insubordination were also widely repressed, regardless of the degree of democracy of specific contexts. Perhaps the most striking evidence of this violence lies in migration policies, in which the militarisation of borders has gone hand in hand with the promotion of an increasingly controlled—and to some extent politically aseptic—idea of migration. At the same time, borders' militarisation has functioned as the most visible sign of the progressive normalisation of violence, operating as an ideological incubator for war as a means of reorganising control over labour. In this process, it is evident that international humanitarian law has entered a phase of decline, reduced today to an instrument of partisan pressure within increasingly contested arenas.

Seen from this perspective, the imagery of the Gaza Riviera does not represent an exception. Rather, it constitutes one of the focal points of capitalist violence in the twenty-first century. In Gaza, the violence that structures the interconnected world of global value networks is concentrated within a very small territory. While, in Israel, some actors pursue a project they imagine will last a thousand years, proposals for the mass confinement of Gazans in "Humanitarian Transit Areas" (Landay—Roston 2025) seek to generalise a condition already imposed elsewhere. This is the condition faced by populations displaced by extractive, industrial, and urbanisation projects: populations pushed to the margins of global metropolises, into new "service" suburbs where living labour is forced into the informal economy and inserted into global financial circuits, scalable precisely at its expense.

Capitalist oases

It is within this context that the silences and the voices now emerging acquire a different meaning, one that exceeds local power struggles or the survival strategies of local elites. Among these voices are those of the Hebron sheikhs who, like Israel, Hamas, and many of their respective supporters, now consider the two-state solution to be obsolete. In its place, they advance a different proposal: coexistence in the name of capital. As reported by the *Wall Street Journal* (Kaufman

2025), their idea is to transform Hebron—currently administered by the Palestinian Authority—into an autonomous emirate that would recognise Israel as a Jewish state and formally join the Abraham Accords. A letter sent by Sheikh Wadee' al-Jaabari to the Israeli Economy Minister Barkat, proposing a discussion of this project, contains several revealing elements. In it, al-Jaabari argues that a fundamental flaw of the Oslo Accords was their recognition of the Palestinian Authority rather than traditional local leadership. This critique condenses, in a striking way, the broader history of the Palestinian Authority that, as it has happened in many other postcolonial contexts, has considered the multiplication of state structures as a response to local demands. The fact that this trajectory has been less successful than others does not negate its shared features with comparable historical processes elsewhere.

The clans involved—whose members today also form part of the militias of the Palestinian Authority—claim to represent approximately 550,000 local residents. They state that they are already engaged in "man-to-man" open discussions with representatives of Israeli settlers in order to reach an agreement that would allow the settlements to remain in place while definitively abandoning the idea of a Palestinian state. According to this proposal, several waves of Palestinian workers—potentially exceeding 50,000 people—would be authorised to enter the State of Israel, reversing the suspension of work permits imposed after 7 October, on the condition of a commitment to "zero tolerance" toward terrorism, and the creation of a large joint economic zone covering roughly 1,000 acres.

While the clan leaders describe the Palestinian National Authority as an abusive structure dedicated to plundering resources and distributing bribes, they share with the settlers a deeper conviction: that ethnic-religious forms of government organised around clans are more representative and more respectful of local balances than the modern state. Israeli scholars quoted in the *Wall Street Journal* argue along similar lines, suggesting that Hamas itself testifies to the failure of the unified state model, even when articulated through religious radicalism. The underlying thesis is that,

beneath the upheavals of recent years, clan affiliation persists and should therefore serve as the foundation for future governance. Hebron, in this view, would function as a testing ground for broader arrangements. The sheikhs, who openly hope for Trump's 'blessing,' imagine the city's future as that of a new Dubai.

They claim that the Palestinian National Authority could be removed within weeks and that Israel itself constitutes the main obstacle because, for years, Israel has been deeply entangled with the PNA in the management and control of the West Bank, to the point that, as seen in recent months, PNA police forces often require Israeli escorts even within areas formally under their authority. The key issue, according to the sheikhs, is avoiding crossfire that could plunge the territory into chaos. Yet, as is often the case, the most cautious assessments come from military figures, particularly retired ones. Former members of the IDF have expressed doubts about the feasibility of a clan-based government, pointing out that clans themselves are frequently divided and locked in competition with one another. At the same time, alongside these future-oriented projects, there is growing recognition that the idea of a Palestinian nation continues to carry aspirations for autonomy—not only from Israel, but also from alternative forms of leadership—that cannot easily be erased through a simple clan agreement. Although corruption is widespread today, the historical trajectory of the Palestinian liberation movement cannot be dismissed so easily. The debate, therefore, remains open.

What is most striking in this debate is its proximity to the language and imaginaries of "development" with which we began, as well as to the region's so-called successful models. These models—if they can be called that—condense a set of ideas, practices, and policies that reflect, sometimes transparently, the desires, or even the unconscious, related to long-standing debates within global business and production circles. They revolve around global supply chains, special economic zones, connectivity, infrastructure, tourism, smart cities, and 'orderly' migration. This is not simply a matter of oil and natural resources, but of how oil

revenues are converted into capital through the formation of transnational agglomerations of interests, labour, and investment flows.

The opening of a massive new Guggenheim Museum branch in Abu Dhabi, following the Louvre; Dubai's consolidation as a routine destination for global tourism; the hosting of Formula One Grand Prix races in the Emirates; the decision to hold the 2034 World Cup in Saudi Arabia; and even discussions about launching the Giro d'Italia from a tourist resort: all of these developments signal the ways in which transnational capital seeks to legitimise itself. It does so by constructing new cultural clouds that impose themselves through the combined force of money and promises of investment.

It was no coincidence that, a few weeks ago, Trump chose Riyadh, hailed by him as the capital of a "beautiful kingdom" (Trump 2025), rather than MAGA-branded Texas as the stage for presenting his vision. In doing so, he echoed and further specified Netanyahu's address to the UN, framing the choice as one between the success stories of the Arabian Peninsula—integrated into global commercial and financial circuits and aligned with the United States—and Iran, portrayed as a country whose leaders steal national wealth while sponsoring terrorism abroad. While doing so, Trump also defended his hard-line immigration policies before an audience of government officials and business leaders, many of whose countries rely on migrant populations subjected to regimes of legalised apartheid through international recruitment systems.

Beyond the paradigm of indifference

This does not mean that we are facing linear or predetermined trajectories. It does, however, help us to understand why many actors respond to wars and massacres primarily by positioning themselves to seize opportunities or to assert a role within emerging scenarios. Iran is one such actor. Through its network of proxies and its fusion with religious components of the Palestinian resistance movement, Iran is often presented as a supporter of the Palestinian cause. Without entering here into a detailed

analysis of the Iranian economy, it is important to note that the regime's rhetorically intransigent stance functions above all as a means of maintaining regional influence in projects and plans that offer an alternative to structures centred on IMEC, while simultaneously exerting control over an internally turbulent society. This posture should not be read as evidence of a genuine willingness to halt the ongoing genocide or to address decades of Palestinian suffering. It is no coincidence that the two occasions on which the Iranian army has been directly involved in attacks on Israel were responses to Israeli aggressions rather than reactions to the crossing of non-existent red lines in Palestine itself. Pursuing an autonomous agenda and asserting a regional role does not, in itself, constitute a desirable alternative, and it should not be confused with it. Beyond the cynicism with which Iran has instrumentalised the Palestinian question in recent years, the real measure of the regime's strategies is visible in the struggles unfolding within Iran. Workers' protests and the "women, life, freedom" movement directly challenge the regime's oppression of workers, migrants, women, and anyone who practices sexual freedom, and they do so at the cost of massive repression. From this perspective, it is entirely inappropriate to celebrate the end of the so-called "12-day war" in the name of anti-imperialist resistance.

Faced with this situation, it is necessary to abandon orientalist attitudes and, without downplaying the decisive role of US and Israeli military power, we must take seriously the red-carpet reception of Trump in the Gulf, the voices emerging from occupied Palestine, and the manifest futility of attempts to contain the situation. Situating Gaza within capital's schemes and new "development" projects does not mean attributing analytical autonomy to these plans, nor ignoring the material contradictions they encounter. Rather, it means seeking to illuminate dimensions that risk remaining in the background, thereby weakening our capacity to confront the processes in which we are embedded. For this reason, this paper does not seek to analyse in detail the competing global projects of the main geopolitical actors, nor to define the new role of China or the BRICS. Instead, its aim is to refocus attention on the tight link between war—

including its most devastating forms—and the current reorganisation of spaces and forms of capitalist valorisation. Within this framework, control over living labour emerges everywhere as the crucial element at stake.

This perspective also helps to clarify what is at stake in Ukraine, where war has been ongoing for more than three years and where an armed re-enactment of the 2015 assault on Greece is unfolding before our eyes. This is not a case of a simple "armed neoliberalism" imposing specific interests. Rather, it is a more complex process in which war operates as a mechanism for synchronising heterogeneous elements, among others the arms economy and the appetites of individual actors (Bonaccorsi 2025). This process is characterised by several interconnected dynamics: the search for new dual-use technological solutions tested directly in the field; the imposition by decree of liberalisations and reforms that dismantle existing labour protections; the forced detention of men of conscription age; the attraction of investment; and the planning of a "recovery" based on the mobilisation of both private capital and living labour in the name of developing "human capital," as exemplified by the Ukraine Recovery Conferences held since July 2022. This dimension is often overlooked, yet it is crucial for understanding what is at stake in the war. The mobility granted to Ukrainians must be read within this framework as a form of supervised mobility, designed to serve the growth of a transnational human capital capable of supplying labour and inventive capacity to Ukraine's "resilience." Even if war and the Russian army stand in the way of the realisation of these projects, they nonetheless demonstrate how the search for new forms of valorisation is continuously at work within war itself.

Any desirable truce in Gaza, as in Ukraine, will therefore have to confront these processes. We cannot rely on institutions and regulatory systems whose redefinition is itself one of the stakes of the war. Nor is it sufficient to reduce what we are experiencing to a timeless condemnation of capitalism and its injustices. Recalling the role of violence in the development of the world market and the commodification of labour provides a framework in which

mass killings, devastation, and displacement are no longer treated as exceptions, and it allows us to grasp their place in the present. Looking at the conflict in Sudan or the war in Congo—both deeply entangled with global interests such as the race for raw materials essential to technological development—makes this clear. Without resorting to moralistic condemnation, we must look at Palestine, Ukraine, and other sites where the Third World War is unfolding with devastating intensity, in order to understand how the pedagogy of war functions both as the most acute form of economic power and as a mechanism for fragmenting and dismantling the revolt of a new transnational proletariat in formation. In this way it is possible to grasp the close link between the genocide in Gaza, the self-serving impotence that surrounds it, and the thread that ties Palestine to Ukraine and to a rearming Europe within a global context. Projects such as the Gaza Riviera, the economy of genocide, and the "recovery" plans for Ukraine indicate that what is at stake today is not the freedom of peoples as such, but the possibility of asserting a right to living labour against the absolute arbitrariness of capital.

A politics in the world

We must not avert our gaze from Gaza. Instead, we must ask how to bring the current situation to an end, without harbouring the illusion that indignation alone can guide our response. Nor should we assume that we are confronted with a form of exceptionalism that would rule out the construction of broad social movements, leaving room only for outward expressions of solidarity. If the analysis developed here captures even partially the current trajectories of capital, then the task before us cannot be addressed by isolating a single "corner of the world" from a global market in turmoil—one that is daily marked by violence directed at workers and migrants. This is why an urgent discussion of transnational forms of politics is required.

Although the present time appears to be dominated by extreme forces, the outcome of the processes discussed in this paper is by no means predetermined. Their direction depends on the capacity to resist, and even more to organise

in ways that can reverse their deadly momentum. This, however, requires that we look in the right direction. Each of the processes analysed here—including the most sinister scenarios, in which the world and its inhabitants are treated as fully available to projects of capitalist valorisation and state power projection—inevitably encounters behaviours, conflicts, and forms of insubordination that movements must neither ignore nor underestimate.

For this reason, we must oppose the appeal to imaginary communities—nations, peoples, or supposedly traditional forms of belonging—that have been reactivated within the transnational reorganisation of capital and its archipelago of capitalist oases. In their place, we must work toward the construction of a community that is anything but imaginary. Such a community can only be grounded in communication and organisation among those who, everywhere, resist or refuse submission to the laws of armed exploitation. This does not mean projecting a utopian unity of all the oppressed. It means, rather, fighting everywhere with this horizon in mind, allowing it to orient struggles, alliances, and forms of organisation capable of confronting the present.

Bibliography

B. Abu-Manneh, 'La resistenza palestinese non è un monolite.' *Jacobin Italia*, https://jacobinitalia.it/la-resistenza-palestinese-non-e-un-monolite/, 2024.

B. Ackerman, 'The Emergency Constitution.' *Yale Law Journal* no. 113, 2004.

L. Adil, D. Eckstein, V. Künzel, L. Schäfer, *Climate Risk Index 2025. Germanwatch.org*, https://www.germanwatch.org/sites/default/files/2025-02/Climate%20Risk%20Index%202025.pdf, 2025.

A. Albán Achinte, *¿Interculturalidad sin decolonialidad?: Colonialidades circundantes y prácticas de re-exsitencia*, in W. Villa, A. Grueso (eds), *Diversidad, interculturalidad y construcción de ciudad*, Universidad Pedagógica Nacional, Bogotá 2008.

G. Alberti, D. Sacchetto, *The Politics of Migrant Labour. Exit, Voice, and Social Reproduction*, Bristol University Press, Bristol 2024.

American Technion Society, 'The Breakthrough Technology That Blocked Iran's Assault on Israel,' *YouTube*, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=556UbLBjbPw, 2025.

ANSA, 'Merz, Israele fa il lavoro sporco per tutti noi in Iran,' June 17, https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/mondo/mediooriente/2025/06/17/merz-israele-fa-il-lavoro-sporco-per-tutti-noi-in-iran_ee26e2d4-e563-421e-b112-ba36f0db6bb3.html, 2025.

A. Aresu, *Le potenze del capitalismo politico. Stati Uniti e Cina*, La Nave di Teseo, Milano 2020.

G. Arrighi, B.J. Silver, *Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1999.

A. Asseraf, 'The Algeria Analogy.' Jewish Current: https://jewishcurrents.org/the-algeria-analogy, 2024.

A. Ayoub, 'Against Multipolar Imperialism. An Internationalist Response with Kavita Krishnan, Promise Li and Romero Kokriatski,' *The Fire These Times*,

https://thefirethesetimes.com/2023/02/17/podcast-against-multipolar-imperialism-an-internationalist-response-w-kavita-krishnan-promise-li-and-romeo-kokriatski/, 2023.

É. Balibar, 'Krieg,' in W.F. Haug, F. Haug, P. Jehle (eds), *Historisch-Kritisches Wörterbuch des Marxismus*, Volume 7/II: *Knechtschaft-Krisentheorien*, Argument Verlag, Berlin 2009.

É. Balibar, 'Geometrie dell'imperialismo al XXI secolo (2/3),' *Effimera*, https://effimera.org/geometrie-dellimperialismo-al-xxi-secolo-2-3-di-etienne-balibar/, 2024.

C. Bayik, *The Statist Paradigm as the Cause of the Middle East Conflict*, in Academy of Democratic Modernity, *Reflections on the Palestinian and Kurdish Resistance. History, Challenges and Solution Perspectives*, https://democraticmodernity.com/reflections-on-the-palestinian-and-kurdish-resistance-history-challenges-and-solution-perspectives/, 2024.

BBC, 'Creator of viral AI Trump Gaza video warns of possible dangers,' March 7, https://www.bbc.com/news/videos/cdrxkm6r856o, 2025.

Berman, L. 'Netanyahu holds up maps illustrating the "blessing" and "curse" facing Mideast,' *The Times of Israel*, September 24, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/netanyahu-holds-up-maps-illustrating-the-blessing-and-curse-facing-mideast/, 2024.

E. Bonaccorsi, '"Il neoliberalismo di guerra non funziona. Siamo in vendita." Intervista a Oleksiy Kushch,' *Il Manifesto*, July 10, https://ilmanifesto.it/il-neoliberismo-di-guerra-non-funziona-siamo-in-vendita, 2025.

Boston Consulting Group, 'Correcting the record on BCG teams' involvement in work in Gaza,' https://www.bcg.com/news/6july2025-clarifying-bcg-involvement-with-aid-in-gaza, 6-7 June 2025.

H. Bouteldja, *Maranza di tutto il mondo, unitevi!*, DeriveApprodi, Bologna 2024.

J. Butler, *Frames of War. When Is Life Grievable?*, Verso, London 2009.

M. Cavalleri, *La resistenza al nazi-fascismo. Un'antropologia*

etica, Mimesis, Milano 2015.
P. Charbonnier, 'The Birth of War Ecology,' *Green. Géopolitique, réseaux, énergie, environnement, nature*, no. 2, 2025.
N. Chomsky, 'On Resistance,' *The New York Review of Books*, 7 December 1967, https://chomsky.info/19G71207.
Climate Class Conflict, 'What Happened to the Climate Movement?,' *Transnational-strike.info*, https://www.transnational-strike.info/2024/07/29/what-happened-to-the-climate-movement/, 2024.
L. Cobbe, G. Grappi, *Primo marzo, percorsi di uno sciopero inatteso* in F. Mometti, M. Ricciardi (eds.), *La normale eccezione. Lotte migranti in Italia*, Alegre, Roma 2011.
A. Colombo, *Guerra civile e ordine politico*, Laterza, Bari-Roma 2021.
D. Craig, *Sovereignty, War and the Global State*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham (CH) 2020.
CUAD - Columbia University Apartheid Divest, *Statement on Columbia's Gaza Solidarity Protest Community Values*, https://www.instagram.com/p/CGC_7ont_Ff/?img_index=3, 2024.
A. Çubukçu, 'On Left Internationalism,' *South Atlantic Quarterly*, no. 3, 2024.
C. Dalla Negra, 'L'8 Marzo e il movimento femminista palestinese,' *Orientxxi.info*, https://orientxxi.info/magazine/articles-en-italien/l-8-march-and-the-palestinian-feminist-movement,4581, 2021.
C. De Ambroggi, *Etnografia di una sovversione. I* resabios *nella società differenziata boliviana*, Viella, Roma 2025.
D.M. De Luca, 'Ukraine, a Late-Capitalist War Effort,' *Jacobin.com*, https://jacobin.com/2024/12/ukraine-late-capitalism-war-russia, 2024.
A. Demirović, 'Materialist State Theory and the Transnationalization of the Capitalist State,' *Antipode. A Radical Journal of Geography*, no. 1, 2021.
S. Dhingra, 'How Hindu Nationalists Redefined Decolonisation in India,' https://newlinesmag.com/ argument/how-hindu-nationalists-redefined-decolonisation-in-india/, 2023.
D. Dirik et. al, 'The Meaning of Internationalism. A Collective Discussion on Pan-African, Early Soviet, Islamic Socialist

and Kurdish Internationalisms Across the 20th Century,' *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, no. 1, 2023.

M. Draghi, *The Future of European Competitiveness*, https://commission.europa.eu/topics/strengthening-european-competitiveness/eu-competitiveness-looking-ahead_en#paragraph_47059, 2024.

Ende Gelände, *Ending Our Silence. State of the Debate of Ende Gelände on Israel/ Palestine*, https://www.ende-gelaende.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/English-Version_Statement_Final2-1.pdf, 2024.

European Commission, *A new European Defence Industrial Strategy*, https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/G43c4a00-0da9-47G8-83cd-a5G28f5c30G3_en?filename=EDIS%20Joint%20Communication.pdf, 2024.

European Defence Agency, *Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030*, https://eda.europa.eu/news-and-events/news/2025/03/19/joint-white-paper-for-european-defence-readiness-2030, 2025.

F. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, Pluto Press, London 1986.

G. Fava, C. Terra (ed.), *Abbecedario dei* Soulèvements de la Terre. *Comporre la resistenza per un mondo comune*, Orthotes, Napoli 2024.

Feminist Initiative Group, *The Right to Resist. A Feminist Manifesto*, https://commons.com.ua/en/right-resist-feminist-manifesto/, 2022.

R. Ferrari, *Lottando nel buio per la luce. Viaggio tra le donne della Rojava*, Enri Edizioni, Bologna, https://www.coordinamentomigranti.org/2025/03/25/lottando-nel-buio-per-la-luce-viaggio-tra-le-donne-della-rojava.

J.B. Fressoz, *More, and More. An All-Consuming History of Energy*, Allen Lane, London 2024.

F. Gambino, *Migranti nella tempesta. Avvistamenti per l'inizio del nuovo millennio*, ombre corte, Verona 2003.

E. Gargiulo, E. Morlicchio, D. Tuorto, *Prima agli italiani. Welfare, sciovinismo e risentimento*, Il Mulino, Bologna 2024.

M. Garrapa, *Frontiere del lavoro. Esternalizzare la frontiera reclutando lavoro agricolo, tra Stati Uniti, Messico e Centro America*, Orthotes, Napoli 2024.

P. Gerbaudo, *The Great Recoil. Politics After Populism and*

Pandemic, Verso, London 2021.

A. Gili, 'Imec: tra opportunità strategiche e complessità geopolitiche,' *Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale*, https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/imec-tra-opportunita-strategiche-e-complessita-geopolitiche-163513, 2024.

T. Ginsburg, D. Lansberg-Rodriguez, M. Versteeg, 'When to Overthrow your Government. The Rights to Resist in the World's Constitutions,' *UCLA Law Review*, no. 60, 2013.

G. Grappi, I. Consolati, *Dopo gli Imperialismi: possibilità e problemi di una politica transnazionale di pace*, https://www.connessioniprecarie.org/2024/05/10/dopo-gli-imperialismi-possibilita-e-problemi-di-una-politica-transnazionale-di-pace-2/, 2023.

b. hooks, *Yearning. Race, Gender, and Cultural Politics*, Routledge, New York and London 2015.

R. Hunter, R. Khachaturian, E. Nanopoulos, *Marxism and the Capitalist State. Towards a New Debate*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham (CH) 2023.

International African Service Bureau, *A Warning to the People of the Colonies*, 1939.

Interventionistische Linke, *Building Counter Power, Seizing Opportunities. IL in Transition*, https://interventionistische-linke.org/sites/default/files/zsp_english.pdf, 2024.

C.L.R. James, 'Is This Worth a War? The League's Scheme to Rob Abyssinia of its Independence,' *New Leader*, 1935.

C.L.R. James, *Why Negroes Should Oppose the War*, Pioneer Publishers, New York 1939.

Jin, Jiyan, Azadî as in Free Palestine, https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSfRwJ2uu02iRyVG3qiGGPugtBfZ3XpC5lT0SFe0DSQ_-1Mu_Q/viewform, 2023.

E. Kaufman, 'A New Palestinian Offer for Peace with Israel,' *Wall Street Journal*, July 5, https://www.wsj.com/opinion/new-palestinian-offer-peace-israel-hebron-sheikh-emirate-36dd39c3, 2025.

A. Kleiss, M. Weber, *Warum die AfD keine Friedenspartei ist*, https://www.rosalux.de/fileadmin/rls_uploads/pdfs/sonst_publikationen/afd-keine-friedenspartei_2024_web.pdf, 2024

C.A. Kupchan, *No One's World. The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012.

X. Lan, *How China Works. An Introduction to China's State-led Economic Development*, Palgrave Macmillan, London 2024.

J. Landay, A. Roston, 'Exclusive: Proposal outlines large-scale "Humanitarian Transit Areas" for Palestinians in Gaza,' *Reuters*, July 11, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-backed-aid-group-proposed-human-transit-areas-palestinians-gaza-2025-07-07/, 2025.

M. Lazzarato, *Guerra o rivoluzione? Perché la pace non è una alternativa*, DeriveApprodi, Bologna 2022.

M. Lazzarato, *Guerra civile mondiale?*, DeriveApprodi, Bologna 2024.

V. Lenin, *Socialism and War* (1915), in *Lenin Collected Works*, vol. 21, Progressive Publisher, Moscow, 1964.

V. Lenin, *War and Revolution* (1917), in *Lenin Collected Works*, vol. 24, Progressive Publisher, Moscow, 1964.

O. Liebermann, D. Karni, 'Battered but not beaten, Hamas embraces guerrilla tactics with deadly force,' *CNN World*, July 12, https://edition.cnn.com/2025/07/12/middleeast/hamas-guerilla-tactics-gaza-attack-intl, 2025.

K. Liebknecht, *Militarismus und Antimilitarismus*, Leipziger Buchdruckerei, Leipzig 1907.

M. Lugones, 'Colonialidad y género,' *Tabula Rasa*, no. 9, 2008.

R. Luxemburg, *The Accumulation of Capital* (1913), Routledge, London and New York 2003.

R. Luxemburg, *Social Reform or Revolution?* (1898), in R. Luxemburg, *Selected Political Writings*, edited by D. Howard, Monthly Review Press, New York 1971.

R. Luxemburg, *Friedensutopien* (1911), in R. Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke*, Band 2, Dietz Verlag, Berlin 2004.

O. Lyubchenko, 'On the Frontiers of Whiteness? Expropriation, War and Social Reproduction in Ukraine,' *LeftEast*, https://lefteast.org/frontiers-of-whiteness-expropriation-war-social-reproduction-in-ukraine/, 2022

D. Mckesson, 'What I know of Justice,' in D. Allen (ed.), *No Justice, No Peace. From the Civil Rights Movements to Black Lives Matters*, Legacy Lit, New York-Boston 2022.

S. Mezzadra, B. Neilson, *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication*

of Labor, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2013.
S. Mezzadra, B. Neilson, *The Rest and The West. Capital and Power in a Multipolar World*, Verso, London 2024.
S. Mezzadra, M. Ricciardi (eds.), *Movimenti indisciplinati. Migrazioni, migranti e discipline scientifiche*, ombre corte, Verona 2013.
W.D. Mignolo, 'It Is a Change of an Era, No Longer an Era of Change,' *Postcolonial Politics*, https://postcolonialpolitics.org/en-is-a-change-of-era-no-longer-the-era-of-changes/, 2023.
W.D. Mignolo, C.E. Walsh, *On Decoloniality: Concepts, Analytics, Praxis*, Duke University Press, Durham and London 2018.
B. Milanović, *Capitalism, Alone: The Future of the System That Rules the World*, Harvard University Press, Harvard 2019.
C.T. Mohanty, *Feminism without Borders. Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity*, Duke University Press, London and Durham, 2003.
B. Montesano (ed.), *Israele-Palestina. Oltre i nazionalismi*, Edizioni e/o, Roma 2024.
C. Mudde, C.R. Kaltwasser, *Populism. A very short introduction*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2017.
H. Münkler, *Über den Krieg. Stationen der Kriegsgeschichte im Spiegel ihrer theoretischen Reflexion*, Velbrück, Veilerswist 2003.
A. Negri, *Il comunismo e la guerra*, Feltrinelli, Milano 1980.
K. Niamanouch, *Resistenza*, in G. Fava, C. Terra, (eds.), *Abbecedario* des Soulèvements de la Terre. *Comporre la resistenza per un mondo comune*, Orthotes, Napoli 2024.
S. Ogno, 'Il Piano Mattei a tutto gas. Più che l'Africa aiuta le multinazionali del fossile,' *ReCommon*, https://www.recommon.org/il-piano-mattei-a-tutto-gas-piu-che-lafrica-aiuta-le-multinazionali-del-fossile/, 2024.
A. Omar, 'The Question of Hamas and the Left,' *Mondoweiss*, https:// mondoweiss.net/2024/05/the-question-of-hamas-and-the-left, 2024.
A. Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception. Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty, Duke University Press, London and Durham 2006.
S. Pankhurst, 'You are Called to the War' (1919), in *A Sylvia Pankhurst Reader*, edited by K. Dodd, Manchester

University Press, Manchester, 1993.
S. Pankhurst, 'The Home Front' (1932), in A *Sylvia Pankhurst Reader*, edited by K. Dodd, Manchester University Press, Manchester 1993.
Permanent Assembly Against the War, 'Manifesto for a Transnational Politics of Peace,' *Transnational Social Strike Platform*, https://www.transnational-strike.info/2022/07/12/manifesto-for-a-transnational-politics-of-peace/, 2022.
Permanent Assembly Against the War, *Life and Politics in Times of War. The Post-Soviet Situation, Eastern Europe and Former Yugoslavia*, Transnational Social Strike Platform, https://www.transnational-strike.info/2023/10/07/pdf-life-and-politics-in-times-of-war-the-post-soviet-situation-eastern-europe-and-former-yugoslavia/, 2023.
A. Quijano, 'Colonialidad y modernidad/racionalidad,' *Perú Indígena*, no. 29, 1992.
M. Ricciardi, 'Si può ancora dire classe? Appunti per una discussione,' *connessioniprecarie*, https://www.connessioniprecarie.org/2023/04/16/si-puo-ancora-dire-classe-appunti-per-una-discussione/, 2023.
M. Ricciardi, *La politica dello Stato globale. Democrazia, migrazioni e neoliberalismo nella società mondo*, Meltemi, Milano 2025.
R.L. Riley, C.T. Mohanty, M.B. Pratt, *Feminism and War. Confronting U.S. Imperialism*, Zed Books, London-New York 2008.
P. Rudan, 'The Strike that Made a Difference,' *Critical Times*, no. 1, 2008.
M. Rutte, '"To Prevent War, NATO Must Spend More." Speech by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte at the Concert Noble, Brussels,' https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_231348.htm, 2024.
D. Sacchetto, R. Andrijasevic, 'Disappearing Workers. Foxconn in Europe and the changing role of Temporary Work Agencies,' *Work, Employment and Society*, No 1, 2017.
E. Said, *Peace and its Discontents. Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process*, Vintage Books, New York 1996.
R. Sánchez Cedillo, *Esta guerra no termina en Ucrania*, Katakrak

Liburuak, Pamplona 2022.
S. Sassen, 'Globalization or Denationalization?,' *Review of International Political Economy*, no. 1, 2003.
A. Sceresini, 'Stanchi di guerra, diserzioni a valanga su entrambi i fronti,' *Il Manifesto*, December 4, https://ilmanifesto.it/stanchi-di-guerra-diserzioni-a-valanga-su-entrambi-i-fronti.
R.L. Segato, *The War Against Women*, Wiley, Hoboken 2024.
S. Shababi, 'Breaking Colonial Chains. Interview with Palestinian activist,' *Fire Next Time*, https://firenexttime.net/breaking-colonial-chains-interview-with-palestinian-activist/, 2023.
B.J. Silver, 'Labour, War and World Politics. Contemporary Dynamics in World-Historical Perspective,' in B. Unfried, M. van der Linden, C. Schindler (eds.), *Labour and New Social Movements in a Globalising World System*, Akademische Verlagsanstalt, Vienna 2024.
Sotsialnyi Rukh, 'Resolution *The Path to Victory and the Tasks of the Ukrainian Left*,' Соціальний рух, https://rev.org.ua/resolution-the-path-to-victory-and-the-tasks-of-the-ukrainian-left/, 2024.
G.C. Spivak, *Can the Subaltern Speak?*, in C. Nelson, L. Grossberg (eds.), *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, Macmillan, London 1988.
W. Streeck, 'A Matter of State. The Politics of German anti-Semitism,' *European Journal of Social Theory*, vol. 28, no. 1, 2024.
P. Tank, 'Kurdish Women in Rojava. From Resistance to Reconstruction,' *Die Welt des Islams*, vol. 57, no. 3-4, 2017.
E. Thompson, 'Notes on Exterminism, the Last Stage of Civilization,' *New Left Review*, no. 121, 1980.
A. Toscano, *Late Fascism. Race, Capitalism and the Politics of Crisis*, Verso, London, 2023.
TSS Platform, 'The Transnational Wager. Constructing New Potentials for Organising,' *Transnational Social Strike Platform*, https://www.transnational-strike.info/2023/10/23/introduction-to-the-discussion-the-transnational-wager-constructing-new-potentials-for-organising/, 2023.
M. Tronti, *La politica al tramonto*, DeriveApprodi, Bologna 2024.
D. Trump, 'Dawn of the bright new day for the great people of the Middle East' Speech in Riyadh, *Times of Israel* May 16,

https://www.timesofisrael.com/full-text-of-trumps-speech-in-riyadh-dawn-of-the-bright-new-day-for-the-great-people-of-the-middle-east/, 2025.

Tsedek! - Collectif juif décolonial, 'Communiqué. Contre l'antisemitisme et son instrumentalisation,' https://tsedek.fr/2024/01/28/contre-lantisemitisme-et-son-instrumentalisation-pour-un-cessez-le-feu-immediat-a-gaza-pour-la-fin-de-loccupation-colonial-et-de-lapartheid-en-palestine/, 2024.

E. Tuck, K.W. Yang, 'Decolonisation is not a metaphor,' *Decolonisation: Indigeneity, Education & Society*, no. 1, 2012.

Union Syndicale Solidaires, 'Macron nous fait la guerre et sa police aussi,' https://emancipation.fr/la-revue/avril-2023/macron-nous-fait-la-guerre-et-sa-police-aussi/, 2023.

H. Wang, *China's Twentieth Century. Revolution, Retreat and the Road to Equality*, Verso, London 2016.

World Economic Forum, *Global Cooperation Barometer 2025*, https://www.weforum.org/publications/the-global-cooperation-barometer-2025/, 2025.

A. Zoakei, 'I regimi di guerra globale e i campisti,' *Euronomade*, https://www.euronomade.info/i-regimi-di-guerra-globale-e-i-campisti/, 2024.